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EMPLOYING INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS FOR 
IMPEACHMENT AND AS SUBSTANTIVE EVIDENCE: 
A CRITICAL REVIEW AND PROPOSED AMEND-
MENTS OF FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 
801(d)(l)(A), 613, and 607 
Michael H. Graham* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 1 which were drafted 
by the Advisory Committee and approved by the Supreme Court, 2 
dealt in a comprehensive manner with. a party's impeachment of his 
own or his opponent's witness by means of prior inconsistent state-
ments. Proposed rule 80l(d)(l)(A),3 advocating a significant de-
parture from the common law, provided that all prior statements in-
consistent with the testimony given by a witness during trial were 
not hearsay. In proposed rule 6074 the Advisory Committee and 
the Supreme Court rejected the traditional reasons offered in support 
of the voucher rule's restrictions on a party's impeachment of his own 
witness, providing instead that "the credibility of any witness may 
be attacked by any party, including the party calling him." Thus, 
the proposed rules eliminated the question whether prior incon-
sistent statements accompanied by a limiting instruction are admis-
sible only for purposes of impeachment; henceforth, courts were to 
admit all such statements as substantive evidence. Complementing 
proposed rules 801(d)(l)(A) and 607, proposed rule 6135 signifi-
cantly eased the traditional foundation requirements imposed by the 
common law as prerequisites to the introduction of extrinsic evidence 
of a prior inconsistent statement. 
The Advisory Committee's comprehensive scheme, however, 
\ 
* Professor of Law, University of Illinois. B.S.E. 1964, University of Pennsyl-
vania; J.D. 1967, Columbia University.-Ed. 
1. Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183 
(1972). 
2. 56 F.R.D. at 184. 
3. 56 F.R.D. at 293. 
4. 56 F.R.D. at 266. 
5. 56 F.R.D. at 278. 
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failed to withstand congressional scrutiny. Although proposed rules 
607 and 613 were adopted without substantive change, Congress, 
motivated by concerns over the reliability of prior inconsistent state-
ments, amended proposed rule 801(d)(l)(A) to provide that only 
prior inconsistent statements "given under oath subject to the penalty 
of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition" 
were admissible as substantive evidence.6 Thus, under rule 801(d) 
( 1) (A) of the Federal Rules of Evidence as enacted, a party may 
introduce a prior inconsistent statement as substantive evidence only 
if it was originally made in testimonial form. That denial of substan-
tive admissibility for most prior inconsistent statements raises two 
serious concerns. First, rule 80l(d)(l)(A) as enacted denies sub-
stantive admissibility to some prior inconsistent statements for which 
there are strong guarantees of reliability. Second, the wisdom of 
rules 607 and 613 appears questionable in light of Congress' con-
cern about the reliability of those prior inconsistent statements no 
longer substantively admissible pursuant to rule 80l(d)(l)(A). 
Under prior federal practice the voucher rule restricting im-
peachment of a party's own witness and the foundation require-
ment for the introduction of extrinsic evidence of a witness' prior 
inconsistent statement operated to curtail potential jury misuse 
of prior inconsistent statements admitted solely for purposes of 
impeachment. 7 Although the Advisory Committee's proposed rules 
607 and 613 altered both these aspects of prior federal practice, no 
consequent abuse of prior inconsistent statements was threatened 
because all such statements were to be admissible as substantive 
evidence. Now, however, with Congress' amendment to proposed 
rule 801(d)(l)(A), the possibility of abuse arises because the limi-
tations Congress engrafted upon proposed rule 801 ( d) ( 1 )(A) were 
not accompanied by corresponding amendments to proposed rules 
607 and 613. 
A further issue raised by the enactment of rule 801(d)(l)(A) 
is whether Congress was not unduly cautious in placing restrictions 
on the rule as initially proposed by the Advisory Committee. Al-
though Congress' concern over the general trustworthiness of prior 
inconsistent statements is clearly justifiable, there remains the ques-
tion whether, in the interest of guaranteeing the reliability of prior 
inconsistent statements, it is necessary to limit substantive admissibil-
ity only to those statements made in a formal setting. 
6. FED. R. Evm. 801(d)(l)(A). 
7. See text at notes 129 & 134 supra. 
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The Federal Rules of Evidence have already been employed as 
a model for the new Uniform Rules of Evidence8 and for several 
state codifications, 9 and yet apparently none of the drafters of these 
schemes gave serious consideration either to expanding admissibility 
under 80l(d)(l)(A) selectively or to controlling potential abuse 
regarding the use of prior inconsistent statements not substantively 
admissible. This Article, after exploring the history, development, 
and rationale of rules 80l(d)(l)(A), 613, and 607, proposes that 
rules 613 and 607 be amended to bring their provisions into con-
formity with rule 801 (d) (1) (A). In the same vein, the Article also 
suggests that rule 801(d)(l)(A) unduly restricts the types of prior 
inconsistent statements substantively admissible thereunder. Ac-
cordingly, it proposes an amendment to rule 801(d)(l)(A) that 
expands the substantive admissibility of prior inconsistent statements 
while seeking to preserve the guarantees of reliability that Con-
gress has seen fit to impose. 
8. Uniform Rules of Evidence, in HANDBOOK OF TIIE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF 
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws 912 (1974). 
9. Several states have adopted evidence rules modeled after the Federal Rules 
of Evidence discussed in this Article. Rule 801(d)(l)(A) is the basis for evidence 
rules in eight states: Arkansas [ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001 (Noncum. Supp. 1976), 
codifying ARK. UNIF. R. Evm. 801 (state adopted all Uniform Rules)]; Maine [ME. R. 
Evrn. 801]; Minnesota [MINN. R. EVID. 801 (state added qualification to 801(d)(l) 
(C) and added new provision, 801(d)(l) (D), to define a "present sense impression" 
as not hearsay)]; Nebraska [NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-801 (1975), codifying NEB. EVID. 
R. 801]; Nevada [NEV. REV. STAT. § 51-035 (1973) (adopted the Preliminary Draft 
version of rule 801, which allows substantive use of all prior inconsistent statements 
of a witness)]; New Mexico [N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-4-801 (Supp. 1975), codifying 
N.M.R. Evm. 801 (adopted the Proposed Draft as submitted to Congress, which 
allows substantive use of all prior inconsistent statements)]; and Wisconsin [WIS. 
STAT. § 908.01 (1975) (adopted the Proposed Draft)]. 
Eight states have adopted rule 607 without change: Arkansas [ARK. STAT. ANN. 
§ 28-1001 (Noncum. Supp. 1976), codifying ARK. UNIF. R. Evm. 607]; Maine [ME-
R. Evm. 607]; Minnesota [MINN. R. Evm. 607]; Nebraska [NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-607 
(1975), codifying NEB. EVID. R. 607]; Nevada [NEV. REV. STAT. § 50.015 (1975)]; 
New Mexico [N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-4-607 (Supp. 1975), codifying N.M.R. EVID. 
607]; and Wisconsin [WIS. STAT.§ 906.07 (1975)]. 
Arkansas [ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001 (Noncum. Supp. 1976), codifying ARK. 
UNIF. R. EvID. 613], Nebraska [NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-613 (1975), codifying Neb. 
EVID. R. 613] and New Mexico [N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-4-613 (Supp. 1975), codifying 
N.M.R. EVID. 613] adopted rule 613 without change. Wisconsin [WIS. STAT. § 
906.13 (1975)] has also adopted rule 613, but it added a proviso that extrinsic 
evidence may be excluded if there is no prior foundation and the witness is no 
longer available. Maine adopted only 613(a) in order to conform to its prior prac-
tice of not ever requiring counsel to confront a witness with his prior statement. See 
Advisors' Note, ME. R. EVID. 613. Nevada enacted the Preliminary Draft version 
of rule 613. NEV. REV. STAT. § 50.135 (1975). Minnesota recently adopted rule 
613 with the caveat that, before the extrinsic evidence of the prior inconsistent state-
ment can be admissible, the witness must have a prior opportunity to explain or deny 
the statement. 
Several other states are considering adopting codes based on the Federal Rules of 
Evidence. Those states include Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Michigan, Montana, North 
Dakota, Ohio, and Vermont. 
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II. RULE 80l(d)(l)(A)-THE BATTLE OVER 
SUBSTANTIVE ADMISSIBILITY 
A. The Orthodox Rule 
The wisdom of admitting as substantive evidence a prior incon-
sistent statement of an in-court witness available for cross-examina-
tion has been thoroughly debated in the literature.10 Although it 
is unnecessary to rehash this dialogue in detail, a short summary of 
the rival contentions is useful to place the relevant issues in perspec-
tive. 
The hearsay rule as developed in the common law excluded use 
of a witness' prior out-of-court statement to prove the truth of the 
matter stated. This denial of substantive effect to a witness' prior 
inconsistent statements, referred to hereinafter as the Orthodox 
Rule, was based on a threefold rationale of lack of trustworthiness: 
(1) the statement was not made under oath, (2) the trier of fact 
did not observe the declarant's demeanor at the time the statement 
was made, and (3) the declarant was not subject to contemporane-
ous cross-examination before the trier of fact by the party against 
whom the statement is being offered.11 Although it is certainly cor-
rect that a prior statement-unless made at an earlier trial, hearing, 
or deposition-will rarely have been made under oath, critics of the 
orthodox view have downplayed the value of the oath and of the 
penalties for perjury as safeguards of trustworthiness; of all the 
recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule, only the prior testimony 
exception requires that the statement have been made under oath.12 
10. See generally McCoRMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 251 (2d 
ed. E. Cleary 1972) [hereinafter cited as McCORMICK]; 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, 
WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE ,r 801(d)(l)[Ol] (1976) [hereinafter cited as WEINSTEIN]; 
3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1018 & 998 n.3 (J. Chadbourn ed. 1970); Falknor, 
The Hearsay Rule and Its Exceptions, 2 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 43 (1954); McCormick, 
The Turncoat Witness: Previous Statements as Substantive Evidence, 25 TEXAS L. 
REV. 573 (1947); Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay 
Concept, 62 HARV. L. REV. 177 (1948); Reutlinger, Prior Inconsistent Stateme11ts: 
Presently Inconsistent Doctrine, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 361 (1974); Silbert, Federal Rule 
of Evidence 80l(dXIXA), 49 TEMP. L.Q. 880 (1976). 
11. See 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 1362; McCORMICK, supra note 10, § 245. 
12. C. McCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 39 (1954) [herein-
after cited as EVIDENCE]. Compare FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) (former testimony ad-
missible as hearsay exception if given under oath) with FED. R. EVID. 801(d) (defin• 
ing certain prior statements by witness and certain admissions by party-opponent as 
"not hearsay") and FED. R. EVID. 803 (certain declarations admissible as hearsay ex-
ceptions regardless of whether declarant is available to testify or whether they were 
given under oath) and FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2)-804(b)(5) (certain declarations ad-
missible as hearsay exceptions if declarant is unavailable regardless of whether they 
were given under oath). 
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Critics of the Orthodox Rule have also rejected the justification be-
hind the traditional requirement that the trier of fact observe the wit-
ness' demeanor when he makes the statement. As Judge Learned 
Hand stated in dismissing the requirement: 
If, from all that the jury see of the witness, they conclude that 
what he says now is not the truth, but what he said before, they are 
none the less deciding from what they see and hear of that person 
and in court.13 
The core of the dispute over substantive admissibility of a 
witness' prior inconsistent statements concerns the final challenge to 
the trustworthiness of such statements-lack of contemporaneous 
cross-examination. The critical question may be stated as follows: 
What is the value of cross-examination that is not conducted contem-
poraneously with the making of the statement whose truth is in ques-
tion before the same trier of fact that must determine whether the 
statement is truthful? The argument that noncontemporaneous 
cross-examination cannot serve the function performed by cross-
examination conducted at the time of the witness' statement is illus-
trated by the following example. W, testifying on direct examina-
tion for the plaintiff, states at trial that plaintiff had a green light 
when the cars entered the intersection. On cross-examination, de-
fense counsel forces W to admit that he feels sorry for the badly 
injured plaintiff and that in fact plaintiff's traffic light was red. In 
this situation, cross-examination by defense counsel has fulfilled its 
purpose. The jury first saw and heard the witness testify to one fact 
and then saw and heard him recant, thus entirely destroying the 
value of his initial testimony. Now assume that W had recanted 
prior to trial. If W's prior statement that the light was green for 
the plaintiff were to be introduced at trial, the scenario would be 
as follows: The defendant calls W, who testifies that the plaintiff 
ran a red light. On cross-examination, the plaintiff's counsel con-
fronts W with his prior statement to a police officer that the light 
was green for the plaintiff. W admits making the statement and ex-
plains upon redirect examination by defense counsel that he made 
the prior statement only because he felt sorry for the badly injured 
plaintiff. 
In each of the above situations, the jury faces a choice between 
two statements and has before it the witness' explanation for their 
inconsistency. The crucial difference according to the proponents 
of the Orthodox Rule is that in the first case the jury has seen the 
13. Di Carlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364, 368 (2d Cir. 1925). 
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witness break down as a result of adversarial confrontation. In the 
second situation, although the jury hears W's explanation of his prior 
statement, the explanation is generally made during examination by 
the party who is depending on W's present testimony (i.e., on re-
direct), a party who obviously desires to help W give a believable 
explanation. Accordingly, proponents of the Orthodox Rule argue 
against the usefulness of subsequent examination designed to rebuild 
a witness' credibility: 
Cross-examination presupposes a witness who affirms a thing being 
examined by a lawyer who would have him deny it, or a witness who 
denies a thing being examined by a lawyer who would have him af-
firm it. Cross-examination is in its essence an adversary proceeding. 
The extent to which the cross-examiner is able to shake the witness, 
or induce him to equivocate is the very measure of the cross-
examiner's success.14 
Under this view, the jury in the first case finds that the defendant's 
adversarial, destructive cross-examination aids it in determining the 
truth of the testimony, but in the second case the jury sees only de-
fense counsel attempting to rehabilitate an impeached witness-a 
less persuasive, less dramatic, and far less clear-cut event.15 
In response, opponents of the Orthodox Rule have contended 
that this difference is meaningless and that cross-examination need 
not be contemporaneous with the making of the statement to be 
effective: 
The line of questioning in each instance is virtually identical, except 
that in the contemporaneous version the witness recants his prior ver-
sion at the conclusion of the cross-examination while in the subse-
quent cross-examination he has already done so. The only difference 
lies in the eye of the cross-examiner, who is in the latter instance de-
prived of a first triumphal flourish.16 
Moreover, it is argued that the Orthodox Rule assumes that the 
14. Ruhala v. Roby, 379 Mich. 102, 124, 150 N.W.2d 146, 156 (1967). 
15. The difference becomes more pronounced in cases in which the witness pro-
fesses a lack of memory about whether he made the prior statement or about its sub-
ject matter. The effectiveness of rehabilitative redirect in these cases varies inversely 
with the extent of the witness' memory loss. Probably at some point the inability 
of the criminal defense attorney to conduct effective redirect examination of a wit-
ness forgetful of the substance of the alleged inconsistent statement would preclude 
substantive admission of the prior statement as violative of the sixth amendment 
right to confrontation. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 168-69 (1970); 4 
WEINSTEIN, supra note 10, 1m 801(d)(l)(A)[04], 801(d)(l)(A)[06], 80l(d)(l)(A) 
[07]. 
16. A letter to the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee from the Stand-
ing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure and the Advisory Committee on 
Rules of Evidence of the Judicial Conference of the United States (May 22, 1974), 
quoted in 4 WEINSTEIN, supra note 10, at 801-6. 
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cross-examiner at trial will be successful in "breaking down" the wit-
ness a la Perry Mason, which obviously is a rare event. Subsequent 
examination (redirect) relating to a prior inconsistent statement, ac-
cording to this argument, will more often have a significant impact 
upon the jury. As stated by the Supreme Court in California v. 
Green: 17 
The defendant's task in cross-examination is, of course, no longer 
identical to the task that he would have faced if the witness had not 
changed his story and hence had to be examined as a "hostile" wit-
ness giving evidence for the prosecution. This difference, however, 
far from lessening, may actually enhance the defendant's ability to 
attack the prior statement. For the witness, favorable to the defen-
dant, should be more than willing to give the usual suggested explana-
tions for the inaccuracy of his prior statement, such as faulty percep-
tion or undue haste in recounting the event. Under such circumstan-
ces, the defendant is not likely to be hampered in effectively attacking 
the prior statement, solely because his attack comes later in time. 
Critics of the Orthodox Rule have not rested with a defense of 
the merits of subsequent cross-examination. They have also at-
tacked the basic rationale of the Orthodox Rule, asserting that the 
primary reason for disallowing substantive use of a witness' prior in-
consistent statement as hearsay-i.e., that the declarant was not then 
subject to cross-examination-simply ignores the realities of the situ-
ation. By hypothesis, the witness is present before the trier of fact, 
is under oath, and is subject to cross-examination. The witness can 
deny making the prior statement or explain the circumstances sur-
rounding the utterance, and his demeanor may be observed through-
out. 
For essentially these reasons, Wigmore concluded that courts 
should grant substantive value to prior inconsistent statements of in-
court witnesses.18 McCormick, supporting Wigmore's position, ar-
gued that prior statements are even more trustworthy than later in-
court statements because they are made closer in time to the event 
they describe.19 This argument, which draws on the obvious prin-
ciple that memory fades with time, suggests as well that there is less 
likelihood that the earlier statement is the result of corruption, false 
17. 399 U.S. 149, 160 (19
1
70). See also 4 WEINSTEIN, supra note 10, at 801-6: 
"[N]ot only does the witness ••• recant his earlier story, but he also explains, in 
not unplausible fashion, the reasons why he did so. This is a cross-examination suc-
cessful beyond the dreams of avarice." With respect to the likelihood of successfully 
"breaking down" the witness, see Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970). 
18. 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 1018. See also Maguire, The Hearsay Sys-
tem: Around and Through the Thicket, 14 VAND. L. REV. 741, 767-68 (1961). 
19. EVIDENCE, supra note 12, § 39. 
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suggestions, intimidation, or appeals to sympathy or prejudice. 
McCormick also contended that substantive admissibility was needed 
to protect parties from the "turncoat" witness, who by changing his 
story deprives the party calling him of essential evidence. 20 
As the final string to their bow, critics of the Orthodox Rule have 
argued that, where the rule is followed, prior inconsistent statements 
are still allowed into evidence, accompanied by an instruction to the 
jury to consider the prior inconsistent statement as bearing solely 
upon the credibility of the witness' in-court testimony and specifically 
providing that the statement cannot be treated as evidence of the 
facts asserted therein. 21 Professor Morgan has called this practice 
a pious fraud22 and along with other scholars23 has argued that a 
jury faces an impossible task when asked to accept a statement as 
20. McCormick, 25 TExAs L. REv. 573, supra note 10. 
21. See, e.g., the form suggested in -1 E. DEVITT & c. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY 
PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS§ 17.16 (3d ed. 1977): 
Effect of Prior Inconsistent Statements or Conduct-By a Witness Not a Party 
Evidence that at some other time a witness, . . . has said or done something, 
or has failed to say or do something, which is inconsistent with the witness' testi-
mony at the trial, may be considered by the jury for the sole purpose of judging 
the credibility of the witness; but may never be considered as evidence or proof 
of the truth of any such statement. 
Federal Rule of Evidence 105 directs the trial judge to give a limiting instruction 
to the jury upon request whenever evidence is admissible for one purpose, such as 
impeachment, but not another. Read literally, the rule suggests that the failure to 
give a limiting instruction can never be reversible error unless counsel had requested 
the instruction at trial. Two recent Fifth Circuit cases have served notice, however, 
that rule 105 will not be so read. The court in United States v. Garcia, 530 F.2d 
650 (5th Cir. 1976), after reviewing earlier cases, reaffirmed the "plain error" stan-
dard under which the failure of the court sua sponte to instruct the jury on the proper 
use of a prior inconsistent statement required reversal of any criminal conviction in 
which the error was not clearly harmless. As the Fifth Circuit reiterated several 
months later in United States v. Sisto, 534 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1976): 
From several prior opinions, Judge Coleman in Garcia distilled the following 
general rule, applicable both before and after the eftective date of the new Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence: "Plain error appears only when the impeaching testi-
mony is extremely damaging, the need for the instruction is obvious, and the fail-
ure to give it is so prejudicial as to affect the substantial rights of the accused." 
534 F.2d at 723 (quoting Garcia, 530 F.2d at 656) (emphasis added). Other circuits 
followed similar standards in criminal cases before 1975, and there is no reason to 
suspect that rule 105 will provoke any change. See, e.g., United States v. Lipscomb, 
425 F.2d 226 (6th Cir. 1970); Benson v. United States, 402 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 
1968); Jones v. United States, 385 F.2d 296 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Newman v. United 
States, 331 F.2d 968 (8th Cir. 1964). 
22. Morgan, supra note 10, at 193. 
23. See, e.g., EVIDENCE, supra note 12, § 39; M. LADD & R. CARLSON, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 820 (1972). See also United States v. Cunningham, 446 
F.2d 194, 200 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971); Isaac v. United States, 
431 F.2d 11, 15-16 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Duff, 332 F.2d 702, 707 (6th 
Cir. 1964) ("jury could hardly help considering the content of the statement as sub-
stantive evidence"); Young v. United States, 97 F.2d 200 (5th Cir. 1938). Cf. Bru-
ton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126 (1968) ("[b]ecause of the substantial risk 
that the jury, despite instructions to the contrary, looked to the incriminating extra-
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bearing on a witness' credibility while ignoring its substantive content. 
In summary, the opponents of the Orthodox Rule argue that, so 
long as the witness is in court and subject to cross-examination, the 
hearsay problems are eliminated and prior inconsistent statements of 
the witness should be substantively admissible. They contend further 
that substantive admissibility is desirable because the proximity of 
prior statements to the event in question makes them more trustworthy 
than in-court testimony and because substantive admissibility pro-
tects parties from turncoat witnesses. Finally, they urge that the 
Orthodox Rule does not accomplish its primary purpose because 
juries are unable or unwilling to distinguish between statements ad-
mitted substantively and those admitted solely as evidence of the wit-
ness' credibility. 
Supporters of the Orthodox Rule have also devised arguments 
to buttress their position. Of course, one enduring argument is that 
a witness' prior inconsistent statement should be denied substantive 
effect because it is technically hearsay, in that the witness was not 
under oath and was not subject to cross-examination before the trier 
of fact when the statement was made. 24 They also contend that 
prior inconsistent statements are often biased as a result of subtle 
influence, coercion, or deceit on the part of the person eliciting the 
statement, who is often an investigator or police officer. 25 Carrying 
judicial statements in determining petitioner's guilt, admission of Evans' confession 
in this joint trial violated petitioner's right of cross-examination"); Shepard v. United 
States, 290 U.S. 96, 104 (1933) (Cardozo, J.) (evidence inadmissible and gravely 
prejudicial for one purpose but admissible and not objectionable for another should 
be excluded from consideration by jury since the task of ignoring the evidence for 
the one aspect while considering it for the other is too subtle for the ordinary mind). 
But see United States v. Lemon, 497 F.2d 854, 858 (10th Cir. 1974) ("presumed that 
jurors will be true to their oath and that they will conscientiously observe the 
instructions and admonitions of the Court"). 
24. See McCORMICK, supra note 10, § 251. These particular arguments against 
substantive admissibility of prior inconsistent statements are not of constitutional 
dimension. The California Supreme Court decided that substantive use violated 
the sixth amendment right to confront witnesses in People v. Johnson, 68 Cal. 
2d 646, 441 P.2d 111, 68 Cal. Rptr. 599 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1051 
(1969), and in People v. Green, 70 Cal. 2d 654, 451 P.2d 422, 75 Cal. Rptr. 782 
( 1969). The United States Supreme Court, however, rejected this contention when 
it reversed Green. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970). In Nelson v. O'Neil, 
402 U.S. 622 (1971), the Court went on to hold that whether the witness admits or 
denies making the prior statement is constitutionally irrelevant. 
25. See Hearings on H.R. 5464 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d 
Cong., 2d Sess. 302 (1974) (statement of Herbert Semmel): 
The problems of inaccurate repetition, ambiguity and incompleteness of out-
of-court statements may be found in both written and oral statements, although 
the problem is more acute in oral statements. But written statements are also 
subject to distortion. We are all familiar with the way a skilled investigator, 
1574 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 75:1565 
this argument one step further, the rule's supporters assert that prior 
inconsistent statements may be completely fabricated, 26 a danger 
that can be eliminated only by the requirement that testimony not 
be accepted substantively unless it is given in court, under oath, and 
subject to cross-examination. Implicitly rejected by this argument 
is the view that examination of either the declarant when he testi-
fies in court or the witness presenting extrinsic proof of the prior 
inconsistent statement will successfully expose a fabrication or bring 
to light any illegitimate influence that acted to color the declarant's 
prior statement. Proponents of the Orthodox Rule also argue that 
no need for a change exists, since present hearsay exceptions permit 
substantive admission of prior inconsistent statements that are in fact 
sufficiently trustworthy.27 Finally, they point out that prior incon-
sistent statements may be used to impeach-and thus to ·neutralize-
an opponent's witness. If a party's own witness unfavorably changes 
his story prior to trial, the party may simply refrain from calling the 
witness. If the party calling the witness is surprised and affirmatively 
damaged by the witness' testimony, he may impeach the witness with 
his prior inconsistent statement.28 Confrontation with the inconsis-
tent statement coupled with fear of perjury prosecution are asserted 
to be sufficient to encourage the witness to adopt the prior statement 
if he actually believes it to be true. 29 
be he ·a lawyer, police officer, insurance claim agent, or private detective, can 
listen to a potential witness and then prepare a statement for signature by the 
witness which reflects the interest of the investigator's client or agency. Adverse 
details are omitted; subtle changes of emphasis are made. It is regrettable but 
true that some lawyers will distort the truth to win a case and that some police 
officers will do the same to "solve" a crime, particularly one which has aroused 
the ·.public interest or caused public controversy. Or the police officer may be 
seeking to put away a "dangerous criminal" who the officer ''knows" is guilty 
but against whom evidence is lacking. 
See also Goings v. United States, 377 F.2d 753, 762 n.13 (8th Cir. 1967): 
Today the art· of statement taking is a recognized science. Inbau & Reid, 
Criminal Interrogation & Confessions (1962); Schwartz, Trial of Automobile 
Accident Cases, Vol. I, § 4, pp. 5, 6, "Requisites of Witnesses Statements", 3rd 
ed. (1965); Smithson, Insurance Law Journal, June, 1958, "Liability Claims and 
Litigation", pp. 375-403; Schweitzer, Cyclopedia of Trial Practice, Vol. I, § 30, 
p. 58, "Securing Statements from Witnesses" (1954); Donaldson Casualty 
Claims Practice, "Richard D. Erwin Series in Risk & Insurance" (1964), pp. 
481-500; Averbach, Handling Accident Cases, Vol. 2, p. 269, (1958). Whether 
the problem be one of fault in communication to a good faith interrogator or 
culpable strategy of the ·examiner, is immaterial. The fact remains, most ex 
parte statements reflect the subjective interest and attitude of the examiner a!I 
well. 
26. See ILLINOIS SUPREME CoURT COMMITTEE ON EVIDENCE, MAJORl1Y REPORT 
ON THE USE OF PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS OF WITNESSES AS SUBSTANTIVE 
PROOF 16 (1971) [hereinafter cited as MAJORl1Y REPORT]. 
27. Marshall, An Analysis, in MAJORl1Y REPORT, supra note 26, at 15 [herein-
after cited as Marshall]. 
28. See text at note 135 infra. 
29. MAJORITY REPORT, supra note 26, at 8. 
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In the face of the controversy over the substantive admissibility 
of prior inconsistent statements, Congress enacted rule 80l(d)(l)(A), 
which reads as follows: 
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay 
if-
( 1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the 
trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concern-
ing the statement, and the statement is (A) inconsistent 
with his testimony, and was given under oath subject to the 
penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, 
or in a deposition. 30 
Rule 801(d)(l)(A) emerged from Congress only after a seesaw 
battle that evidenced deep concern over the reliability and trust-
worthiness of prior inconsistent statements. As drafted by the Advi-
sory Committee and submitted by the Supreme Court, rule 
801(d)(l)(A) provided for substantive use of all prior inconsistent 
statements: 
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay 
if: 
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the 
trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concern-
ing the statement, and the statement is (A) inconsistent 
with his testimony. 31 
The Advisory Committee, following the path of the California Law 
Revision Commission, 32 concluded that the arguments in favor of 
treating prior inconsistent statements as -hearsay did not withstand 
analysis. Specifically, the Advisory Committee stated in its Note 
that the absence of an oath, cross-examination, and observation of 
demeanor at the time that the prior statement was made could each 
be adequately supplied by later examination at trial.33 
The version of rule 80l(d)(l)(A) enacted into law, however, 
shows that the Advisory Committee failed to persuade Congress that 
30. FED. R. Evm. 80l(d)(l)(A). 
31. Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 
293 (1972). For earlier drafts of this proposed rule, see Revised Draft of Proposed 
Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates, 51 F.R.D. 315, 413 
(1971), and Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States 
District Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161, 331 (1969). 
32. 56 F.R.D. at 296. See CAL. Evm. CoDE § 1235 (West 1966), and the Cal-
ifornia Law Revision Commission's Comment on § 1235, reprinted in 29B CAL. Evm. 
CooE 221. 
33. Advisory Committee Note to Proposed Rule 801, 56 F.R.D. 183, 295 (1972). 
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substantive admissibility for all prior inconsistent statements was de-
sirable. Rather, as the legislative history of rule 801(d)(l)(A) 
suggests, Congress ultimately came to accept arguments for the 
unreliability of prior inconsistent statements, particularly those that 
pointed to the risk of total fabrication. 34 Congress' consideration of 
proposed rule 801(d)(l)(A) commenced in the House Committee 
on the Judiciary. Initially, a subcommittee report recommended 
adoption of a compromise rule patterned after decisions of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The Second 
Circuit had approved substantive admissibility of prior inconsistent 
statements given under oath at a former trial or in grand jury testi-
mony in the same proceeding. 35 The House subcommittee incor-
porated the Second Circuit's position by adding the following lan-
guage to the proposed rule: 
(A) Inconsistent with his testimony and was given under oath 
and subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial or hearing or in deposi-
tion or before a grand jury .... 36 
The full House Judiciary Committee next added a requirement that, 
in order to be substantively admissible, the prior statements must 
have been subject to contemporaneous cross-examination. This 
committee also struck the reference to grand jury proceedings. The 
committee's final version of rule 801(d)(l)(A), which eventually 
was passed by the House, stated: 
(A) Inconsistent with his testimony and was given under oath 
subject to cross-examination, and subject to the penalty of perjury at 
a trial or hearing or in a deposition. . . . 37 
The House Judiciary Committee's report indicated the nature of 
the concerns that prompted both the committee and the full House 
34. See H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1973). See also United 
States v. Leslie, 542 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1976); notes 38, 45 & 46 infra. 
35. See United States v. De Sisto, 329 F.2d 929 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 
979 (1964). In United States v. Cunningham, 446 F.2d 194, 197 n.3 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 404 U.S. 90 (1971), the court said: "Professor Chadbourn, referring to this 
as 'the Second Circuit view,' has noted the carefully marked boundaries which limit 
it. 3A WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 1018, at 997-98 (Chadbourn rev. 1970)." 
36. Hearings on H.R. 5463 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, 93d Cong., 
1st Sess., 170 Supp. (1973 ). The Second Circuit rule was developed in criminal 
cases. Since rule 801(d)(l)(A) is applicable to civil cases as well, the inclusion of 
deposition testimony was a natural and logical extension. 
37. See H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1973)[hereinafter cited as 
HOUSE REPORT]. Although it is not clear in the House committee report, the right 
of cross-examination in the formal proceeding presumably was intended to require 
that, in a criminal case, the party against whom the testimony was being offered have 
the opportunity and motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect ex-
amination. Cf. FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(l) (similar approach to admission of prior 
testimony); HousE REPORT, supra at 15 (same). 
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to place limitations on proposed rule 80l(d)(l)(A). Under the 
House's approach, "[u]nlike in most other situations involving un-
sworn or oral statements, there can be no dispute as to whether the 
prior statement was made; and . . . the context of a formal proceed-
ing, an oath, and the opportunity for cross-examination provide firm 
additional assurance of the reliability of the prior statement."38 Al-
though rule 801(d)(l)(A) was to apply in both civil and criminal 
proceedings, various statements in the legislative record suggest that, 
in attacking the reliability of a witness' prior inconsistent statements, 
the House was focusing on the rule's potential impact upon the 
criminal defendant. 39 The House was concerned that a defendant 
could be convicted solely on the basis of a witness' alleged out-of-
court statement, even though the statement was disputed by the wit-
ness' own testimony and no certain evidence existed establishing that 
the witness had accurately recounted the information in the statement 
and, more fundamentally, that the statement had ever been made. 
After the House adopted its version of rule 80l(d)(l)(A),40 
38. HousE REPORT, supra note 37, at 13. Thus the House believed that the rule 
would both ensure reliability and help neutralize the effect of any influence, coercion, 
or deceit directed at the witness. 
39. See, e.g., letter from James F. Schaefer, Chairman of the Committee on Fed-
eral Evidence and Procedure, Trial Lawyers of America, to Rep. William L. Hungate 
(June 22, 1973) and accompanying material, in Hearings on Proposed Rules of Evi-
dence Before the Subcomm. 011 Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 127-29 Supp. (1973); Hearings 011 H.R. 5463 (Federal Rules 
of Evidence) Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 50-52 
(1974) (statement of Edward W. Cleary). But see letter from Edward W. Cleary 
to Herbert E. Hoffman, Counsel, Subcommittee on Reform of Federal Criminal 
Laws, House Committee on the Judiciary, May 31, 1973, in Hearings on Proposed 
Rules of Evidence Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. 011 
the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 98-99 Supp. (1973) (rejecting exclusion of such evi-
dence). See also letter from Hon. Albert B. Maris to Herbert E. Hoffman, May 30, 
1973, in Hearings on Proposed Rules of Evidence Before the Subcomm. on Criminal 
Justice of the House Comm. 011 the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 98 Supp. (1973). 
40. Professor Cleary, in testimony before the Senate subcommittee discussing the 
limitations placed by the House upon the admissibility of substantive evidence, stated: 
"Their effect is for all practical purposes virtually to destroy the utility of the rule 
as a solution for the problems it was designed to meet, such as fading memories, 
bribery, intimidation, and other influences which cause witnesses to change their 
stories." Hearings on H.R. 5463 (Federal Rules of Evidence) Before the Senate 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1974) (statement of Edward W. 
Cleary). 
Professor Cleary had earlier stated that 
[t]he redraft would virtually destroy the utility of provision (A), which deals 
with prior inconsistent statements. If the witness has made a prior statement 
under oath, the threat of a perjury charge makes it highly unlikely that he will 
subsequently relate a different story again under oath. Hence the instances in 
which the rule would operate under the suggested redraft would be greatly cur-
tailed. The problem area consists of cases in which the prior statement was not 
under oath, whether in the course of a judicial proceeding or not, and a rule 
which does not deal with these cases is of no practical significance. 
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consideration of the matter moved to the Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary. The Senate committee recommended reinstatement of 
the rule proposed by the Advisory Committee and the Supreme 
Court, concluding in its report that the requirements of oath and op-
portunity for cross-examination were "unnecessary" since those ele-
ments were present when the witness testified at trial. 41 The full 
Senate eventually accepted the recommendation of its committee, 
and consequently the conflicting House and Senate proposals were re-
ferred to the conference committee. 
The version of rule 801(d)(l)(A) that emerged from the con-
ference committee, which was the version finally enacted by Con-
gress, is as interesting for its packaging as for its resolution of the 
disputed issues. The conference report42 stated that the Senate ver-
sion of rule 80l(d)(l)(A), which contained the approach originally 
proposed by the Advisory Committee, was adopted with an amend-
ment requiring that prior inconsistent statements were substantively 
admissible only if they were made at a trial, hearing, deposition, or 
other proceeding under oath and subject to penalty of perjury. The 
report stated that the "other proceedingt' provision would allow testi-
mony given before a grand jury. 
Despite the suggestion by the conference committee that it had 
largely adopted the Senate's version of rule 80l(d)(l)(A), the rule 
proposed by the conference committee and accepted by Congress 
clearly incorporates the substance of the House version of the rule. 
Enacted rule 801(d)(l)(A) limits substantive admissibility to those 
Letter from Edward W. Cleary to Herbert E. Hoffman, May 31, 1973, in Hearings 
on Proposed Rules of Evidence Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the 
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 98-99 Supp. (1973 ). 
The foregoing testimony may well have been a slight overstatement made in the 
heat of a battle to have the Supreme Court-promulgated rule 801(d)(l)(A) approved 
by Congress. Statements made at the grand jury or preliminary hearing (in criminal 
cases) or in depositions (in civil proceedings) would have substantive effect. These 
proceedings give the state and the civil litigant an important opportunity to solidify 
the testimony of its witnesses. One must admit, however, that although it is not 
uncommon for witnesses to testify differently at trial than at deposition or grand 
jury, these inconsistencies are generally slight. In fact, with respect to many such 
statements, one needs a magnifying glass to find the discrepancy; it often manifests 
itself only in the attitude of examining counsel. 
41. S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 15-16 (1974). The Senate committee 
first noted that of all the traditional hearsay exceptions only the former testimony 
exception requires that the prior statement be made under oath. The committee then 
asserted that the jury has sufficient demeanor evidence to judge the credibility of the 
prior statement if the declarant was presently testifying in court. Finally, the com-
mittee felt that its rule was superior because the prior statements, having been made 
closer in time to the events they describe, would have been subject to less improper 
influe9ce and would have been made when the witness' memory was relatively fresh. 
42. CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1974). 
August 1977] Employing Inconsistent Statements 1579 
prior inconsistent statements for which there is ( 1) almost absolute 
certainty that the statement was made43 and (2) additional assurance 
of reliability and truthfulness because of the requirement that the 
prior statement must have been given in a formal proceeding. 44 
43. EVIDENCE, supra note 12, § 39 states this principle as the hazard of reporting 
mistransmission, including the risks of honest error or of fabrication. 
44. Although Congress' substantial concern over the reliability of prior incon-
sistent statements would seem to argue for a strict reading of rule 80l(d)(l)(A), 
the early experience of the rule in the courts suggests that it may be broadened in 
two ways: first, under the "other proceedings" language of the rule itself, and, second, 
under the catchall hearsay exception of rule 803 (24). 
In United States v. Castro-Ayon, 537 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 
983 (1976), a case involving the breadth of rule 801(d)(l)(A)'s reference to "other 
proceedings," the Ninth Circuit decided that sworn tape-recorded statements made 
during interrogation by a border agent were substantively admissible. Examining the 
legislative history of rule 801(d)(l)(A), the court, while noting that the phrase 
"other proceedings" was explicitly intended to cover grand jury proceedings, found 
the term not so limited, reasoning that Congress could easily have made such limita-
tion express. 537 F.2d at 1057 n.3. Moreover, the court argued that inclusion of 
the border interrogation within the "other proceedings" language of rule 801(d)(l) 
(A) was supported by the similarity of such interrogation to a grand jury proceeding: 
[W]e note that the immigration proceeding before Agent Pearce bears many 
similarities to a grand-jury proceeding: both are investigatory, ex parte, inquisi-
tive, sworn, basically prosecutorial, held before an officer other than the arrest-
ing officer, recorded, and held in circumstances of some legal formality. In-
deed, this immigration proceeding provides more legal rights for the witnesses 
than does a grand jury: the right to remain totally silent, the right to counsel, 
and the right to have the interrogator inform the witness of these rights. 
537 F.2d at 1058. 
Although the court noted at the same page that not "every sworn statement given 
during a police-station interrogation would be admissible," the logic of the opinion 
does not readily provide a clear stopping point. In Castro-Ayon it5elf, the fact that 
the statements were tape-recorded and that the witnesses later admitted their making 
would appear to satisfy the standards of accuracy and reliability set by Congress. 
Whether similar safeguards will exist in other situations to which rule 801(d)(l)(A) 
may be extended remains to be seen. 
Although Castro-Ayon may well have charted the outer boundaries of rule 801(d) 
( 1 )(A), there exists another avenue by which a witness' prior inconsistent statement 
may gain substantive admission-the catchall hearsay exception of Federal Rule of 
Evidence 803(24). This rule excludes from the hearsay rule 
[a] statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but 
having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court deter-
mines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the 
statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other 
evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) 
the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served 
by admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be 
admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the ad-
verse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse 
party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his intention to offer the 
statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the declar-
ant. 
In United States v. Iaconetti, 406 F. Supp. 554 (E.D.N.Y.), affd., 540 F.2d 574 
(2d Cir. 1976), rule 803(24) was asserted to provide an alternative basis for the ad-
mission of a witness' prior consistent statement. The trial court noted briefly that 
the statement was also admissible under rule 801(d)(2)(C) (admissions by an 
agent) and rule 801 (d)(l)(B) (prior consistent statement to rebut charge of recent 
fabrication), but devoted most of its analysis to the statement's admissibility under 
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rule 803 (24). The court found that the witness' prior statement possessed circum-
stantial guarantees of trustworthiness, in that it was made minutes after the event it 
related and was made to a business partner and attorney of the witness, thus suggest-
ing minimal risks of faulty memory or insincerity. That the witness was available 
for cross-examination regarding the statement's making was also deemed to support 
its reliability. With respect to the other requirements of rule 803(24), the court 
found that the statement was evidence of a material fact, and, moreover, the most pro-
bative evidence available since there was a direct conflict between the testimony of 
the defendant and of the witness who had allegedly made the prior statement. The 
importance of the evidence to resolution of that conflict also indicated to the court 
that admission of the prior statement was consistent both with the general purposes 
of rule 803 (24) and with the interests of justice. Finally, although the defendant 
did not receive notice of the government's intention to produce the statement until 
after the trial had begun-and thus arguably outside the period required by rule 803 
(24 )-the court ruled that it was sufficient that the defendant had received the notice 
five days before the government's actual use of the statement. The Second Circuit 
subsequently approved of the court's application of rule 803(24). 540 F.2d 574. 
In a recent case, United States v. Leslie, 542 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1976), the Fifth 
Circuit held that the analysis of rule 803(24) developed in Jaconetti supported sub-
stantive admission of a witness' prior inconsistent statement. In Leslie, three alleged 
accomplices of the defendant, called to the stand as court witnesses, testified that the 
defendant was not aware that a car that he later sold was a stolen vehicle. The wit-
nesses admitted having given prior statements to the FBI that contradicted that testi-
mony, but, claiming that they had been influenced by expectations of favorable treat-
ment and that they had also been under the influence of various drugs, the witnesses 
asserted that parts of those statements were untrue and that other parts were not 
within their memory. In response, the government introduced evidence to show that 
the prior statements had been freely given, without promise of reward and unaffected 
by drugs. Although the trial judge had briefly instructed the jury not to consider the 
witnesses' prior statements as substantive evidence, the court on appeal did not reach 
the question whether that instruction was adequate, as it concluded after reviewing 
Jaconetti that the prior statements were admissible as substantive evidence under rule 
803(24). In support of its conclusion, the court cited five circumstantial guarantees 
of the statements' reliability: first, the declarants were available for cross-examina• 
tion; second, the statements followed the events they described by only a few hours; 
third, the declarants admitted voluntarily signing forms waiving their right to re-
main silent; fourth, the witnesses admitted making the prior statements; and fifth, the 
three statements, made before the declarants could agree on one story, were substan• 
tially identical. The court discounted the witnesses' mere "hope" of favorable treat• 
ment and thought the evidence refuted their claim of having been under the influence 
of drugs. With respect to the other requirements of rule 803(24), the court found 
the statements to be evidence on the material issue of whether the defendant was the 
ringleader of the group or was just innocently along for the ride. Additionally, the 
statements were said to be the most probative evidence available, since only the four 
persons involved in the theft and transportation actually knew what had been 
planned. As the evidence of these plans was conflicting, introduction of the prior 
statements was asserted to best serve the interests of justice, the jury needing "all the 
help it could get." 542 F.2d at 291. Although the notice required by rule 803(24) 
was apparently not given, the court, following laconetti, ruled that strict adherence 
to that requirement could be dispensed with where, as the court found to be true in 
Leslie, the opposing party was not prejudiced. 
laconetti and Leslie suggest that courts will use rule 803(24) to justify substan-
tive admission of prior consistent and inconsistent statements of in-court witnesses 
when such statements appear reliable. Technical requirements such as notice will 
likely be liberally construed. With respect to a witness' prior inconsistent statement, 
even though the statement may not be admissible under rule 801(d)(l)(A), the wit• 
ness' availability for cross-examination, strong evidence that the statement was in fact 
made, and the presence of a serious conflict between the prior statement and the wit-
ness' in-court testimony are likely to argue persuasively that the statement be ad• 
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Thus, even though Congress did delete the House's requirement of 
an opportunity for contemporaneous cross-examination, it is clear 
that Congress ultimately accepted the House's basic position that 
only the most reliable prior inconsistent statements should be admis-
sible in a criminal action. 45 By the same token, it rejected the 
mitted as substantive evidence. See generally Graham, Examination of a Party's 
Own Witness Under the Federal Rules of Evidence: A Promise Unfulfilled, 54 TEXAS 
L. REV. 917, 972-75 (1976). 
At the same time, it should be recognized that the substantive admission of a 
prior inconsistent statement, even under rule 801 ( d) (1 )(A), will not divest the court 
of control over its usage. In United States v. Librach, 536 F.2d 1228, 1232 (8th Cir. 
1976), at trial on remand the defense counsel read into evidence certain testimony 
of government witnesses from the earlier trial which was inconsistent with their pres-
ent testimony. The trial court properly granted the evidence substantive value, but 
refused to allow counsel to reread the prior testimony during closing argument. In 
response to the defendant's claim that the substantive value of the prior testimony 
was thus undermined, the Eighth Circuit affirmed, unable to conclude that the jury 
had failed to understand the substantive quality of the prior testimony and noting that 
one of the reasons for granting substantive value to certain statements was that the 
jury was likely to do so even when operating under a contrary instruction. 
45. One indication that the limitation in scope of rule 801 (d)(l )(A) was a result 
of concern with fairness for the criminal defendant is that the drafters of UNIFORM 
RULE OF EVIDENCE 80l(d){l)(A) designed it to permit substantive use of all prior 
inconsistent statements in civil cases, while adopting the federal rule for criminal pro-
ceedings. See also letter from Edward W. Cleary to Herbert E. Hoffman, May 31, 
1973, in Hearings on Proposed Rules of Evidence Before the Subcomm. on Criminal 
Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 98-99 Supp. 
( 1973): "Apparently the premise that underlies the suggested redraft is that a state-
ment not made under penalty of perjury is an insufficient basis to support a convic-
tion. See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 [1945]; cf. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 
149 [1970]." 
A Note by the Federal Judicial Center also attributes Congress' opposition to pro-
posed rule 801{d){l)(A) as indicating concern that criminal defendants might be 
convicted solely upon evidence of witnesses' prior inconsistent statements. Federal Ju-
diciary Center Note on Rule 801, Federal Rules of Evidence for United States Courts 
and Magistrates, 98 n.3 (West 1975). In support of unrestricted admission of prior 
inconsistent statements, the Federal Judicial Center's Note stressed that rule 80l(d) 
{l){A) was addressed to admissibility, not to the question of sufficiency of the evi-
dence to support a conviction. The Judicial Center Note states that "factual circum-
stances could well arise where, if this were the sole evidence, dismissal would be ap-
propriate." S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 n.21 (1974). But cf. People 
v. Green, 3 Cal. 3d 981, 279 P.2d 998, 92 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1971) (a jury conviction 
based upon substantive admission of prior inconsistent statement withstood a motion 
directed to insufficiency of the evidence). For a discussion of burden of proof as 
it affects substantive admission of prior inconsistent statements, see Comment, Prior 
Inconsistent Statements and the Rule Against Impeachment of One's Own Wit-
ness: The Proposed Federal Rules, 52 TEXAS L. REV. 1383 (1974). 
A court might be reluctant to grant a defendant's motion for acquittal pursuant 
to FED. R. CRIM. P. 29 where the only incriminating substantive evidence was a prior 
inconsistent statement, since disregarding the statement would certainly not be con-
struing all the evidence most favorably to the government. See Crawford v. United 
States, 375 F.2d 332, 334 (D.C. Cir. 1967). However, the Supreme Court observed 
in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 163 n.15 (1970), that "considerations of due 
process, wholly apart from the Confrontation Clause, might prevent convictions 
where a reliable evidentiary basis is totally lacking." United States v. Schwartz, 390 
F.2d 1, 7 (3d Cir. 1968), reversed a conviction in which a prior inconsistent state-
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contention advanced by supporters of the Advisory Committee and 
Senate· position that protection of the criminal defendant from un-
warranted conviction based solely upon a prior inconsistent state-
ment is properly the function of rules designed to evaluate the 
sufficiency of evidence rather than of rules governing its substantive 
admissibility. 46 
C. A Proposed Amendment to Rule 801(d)(J)(A) 
From the above review of the Orthodox Rule and the positions of 
the commentators, the Advisory Committee, and Congress, it is ap-
parent that the dispute over the substantive admissibility of prior in-
consistent statements revolves around the question of what circum-
stances will provide sufficient assurance that a prior statement was 
indeed made and that subtle influence, coercion, or deception has not 
impaired its reliability. It should be recognized that concern with fab-
rication, subtle influence, coercion, and deception is an implicit re-
jection of the Orthodox Rule's contentions with respect to oath and 
demeanor and accordingly is a recognition of the limited effec-
tiveness of cross-examination in discovering the truth at a modern 
trial. Moreover, such concern acknowledges the difficulty inherent 
in the trier of fact's task of determining whether to believe the wit-
ness who denies making a prior inconsistent statement or the witness 
who offers extrinsic evidence of the statement's existence. Rather 
than entrust that responsibility solely to the trier of fact, Congress 
chose to limit substantive admissibility of prior inconsistent state-
ments to situations in which the likelihood of total fabrication was 
practically nonexistent and the risk of subtle influence, coercion, or 
deception was significantly reduced. 47 
ment had been given substantive effect, noting, however, that "[e]ven if this testi-
mony were in the record, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence against de-
fendant." 
46. See 4 WEINSTEIN, supra note 10, ,r 801(d)(l)(A)[0l] at 801-76.1 (1975); 
Stalmack, Prior Inconsistent Statements: Congress Takes a Compromising Step Back-
ward in Enacting Rule 80/(dXIXA), 8 LoY. Cm. L.J. 251, 267 (1977). 
47. The same issue arises with respect to admissions. As experienced trial coun-
sel know, it is not unusual for one party to claim that the opponent said something 
that the opponent flatly denies having said. Here, the rules of evidence say the jury 
is to decide the issue of credibility, and yet this situation and that regarding the sub-
stantive admissibility of prior inconsistent statements would appear to be identical. 
Moreover, how is fabrication by the in-court declarant of alleged present sense im-
pressions, excited utterances, or other hearsay exceptions prevented? What, then, dis-
tinguishes testimony regarding prior inconsistent statements of an in-court declarant 
from testimony of a witness _relating an alleged admission or hearsay exception? In 
what sense do prior inconsistent statements lack the indicia of reliability thought to 
justify admission of recognized hearsay exceptions? On what ground does the adver-
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Acknowledging the legitimacy of Congress' concern regarding 
rule 80l(d)(l)(A), it nevertheless appears that the rule's safe-
guards, which are designed to ensure that a prior inconsistent state-
ment was actually made and accurately recorded, .are overly strict. 
Why should the rule exclude because of doubt about whether it was 
made a signed or handwritten statement that is acknowledged by 
the witness or proved to be his by other evidence? Why should it 
exclude an oral statement not made under oath when the witness 
during his testimony admits he made it?48 Why should the rule ex-
clude on any ground substantive admission of prior inconsistent state-
ments in an affidavit prepared by the party's attorney that was exe-
cuted under oath and submitted to the court in the same or another 
proceeding?49 
Alternative proposals have been advanced that would authorize 
substantive admission of prior inconsistent statements where it is suf-
ficiently established that they were made. These proposals assert 
that substantive admissibility should extend to all prior inconsistent 
statements for which there are substantial guarantees of certainty of 
making and accuracy of reporting and for which an effective oppor-
tunity exists for cross-examination to expose and counteract any im-
propriety that may have occurred in the taking of the statement. 
Professor McCormick, for example, has suggested the following 
rule: 
A statement made on a former occasion by a declarant having 
an opportunity to observe the facts stated, will be received as evi-
dence of such facts, notwithstanding the rule against hearsay if 
(1) the statement is proved to have been written or signed 
by the declarant, or to have been given by him as testimony in 
a judicial or official hearing, or the making of the statement is 
sary process accept the risk that a party will fabricate a statement of his opponent 
but reject the same risk regarding statements of a witness unless such statements oth-
erwise fall into a recognized hearsay exception? 
48. If the witness also admits that his prior inconsistent statement is true, the 
statement is substantively admissible as adopted testimony. See, e.g., United States 
v. Tavares, 512 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Ellis, 461 F.2d 962 (2d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 866 (1972); Tripp v. United States, 295 F.2d 418 (10th 
Cir. 1961); Stevens v. United States, 256 F.2d 619, 623 n.9 (9th Cir. 1958). 
"When a witness thus affirms the truth of a prior statement, the earlier state-
ment is to be considered 'not only as bearing on the credibility of the witness but 
as affirmative evidence.' . . • fl1he trier of the facts has 'two conflicting statements 
... of equal force as evidence.'" United States v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376, 391 (2d 
Cir. 1964), cert. denied sub nom. Mogavero v. United States, 379 U.S. 960 (1965) 
(citation omitted), in part quoting Stewart v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 137 F.2d 527, 529 
(2d Cir. 1943), and Zimberg v. United States, 142 F.2d 132, 136 (1st Cir.), cert. 
denied, 323 U.S. 712 (1944). 
49. See United States v. Schwartz, 252 F. Supp. 866 (E.D. Pa. 1966). 
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acknowledged by a declarant in his testimony in the present pro-
ceeding, and 
(2) the party against whom the statement is offered is af-
forded an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. i;o 
Professor McCormick's proposal contained one important qualifica-
tion: it would require that the declarant have personal knowledge 
of the facts stated. The English Evidence Act of 1938 contained 
a similar personal knowledge requirement: 
In any civil proceeding where direct oral evidence of a fact would 
be admissible, any statement made by a person in a document and 
tending to establish that fact shall, on production of the original 
document, be admissible as evidence of that fact if the following 
conditions are satisfied, that is to say-
(i) if the maker of the statement either-
(a) had personal knowledge of the matters dealt with by 
the statement; 
(b) [made the statement as part of a business record]; 
and 
(ii) if the maker of the statement is called as a witness in the 
proceedings . . . . 51 
Although the effect of the personal knowledge requirement has 
not been elaborated upon by the authors of the proposals that adopt 
it, 52 the requirement has at least two very important consequences. 
First, only a witness with personal knowledge of the subject matter 
of a prior inconsistent statement can be cross-examined about 
whether the statement is truthful. Second, the requirement ex-
cludes from evidence all prior statements of a witness that merely 
narrate a third person's declaration unless the witness also has per-
50. McCormick, 25 TEXAS L. REv. 573, supra note 10, at 588. See also EVI-
DENCE, supra note 12, § 39, at 82. 
51. Evidence Act, 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6 c. 28, § 1, repealed by Civil Evidence 
Act, 1968, c. 64, § 20(2). The personal knowledge requirement was also incorpo-
rated in a proposal advanced by Professor Falknor. Out-of-court declarations would 
have been substantively admissible under the Falknor proposal if 
previously made by a person who is present at the hearing and available for cross-
examination if the judge finds that (a) the declarant had an adequate opportu-
nity to perceive the event or condition which the statement narrates, describes 
or explains and (b) the statement was written or signed by the declarant or the 
making of the statemept is acknowledged by the declarant in his testimony in 
the present proceeding. 
Falknor, supra note 9, at 54. Note that, as is true of Professor McCormick's pro-
posal and of the 1938 English Evidence Act, the rule designed by Professor Falknor 
would apply to all out-of-court declarations, regardless of whether inconsistent with 
in-court testimony. 
52. Falknor alone discusses the need for a personal knowledge requirement, and 
he considers only its impact upon cross-examination, thus failing to analyze the sig-
nificance of its exclusion of all second-hand hearsay not grounded in personal knowl-
edge of the facts related. Falknor, supra note 9, at 53-54. See text at notes 53-62, 
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sonal knowledge of the facts underlying the third person's state-
ment. 53 Thus a witness' prior statement that he heard a criminal 
def~ndant make an incriminating admission would be inadmissible 
as substantive evidence unless the witness had personal knowledge 
of the incriminating conduct itself. In effect, the personal know-
ledge requirement excludes from evidence those statements most 
open to fabrication54 while concurrently assuring the opportunity for 
effective cross-examination. Coupled with strong guarantees that 
the prior inconsistent statement was actually made, 55 cross-examina-
tion-here, really redirect examination-of a witness with personal 
knowledge of the underlying facts can be expected to test effectively 
the reliability of the prior statement. 56 
The following illustration demonstrates the importance of the 
requirement of personal knowledge. Assume that in a bank 
robbery prosecution the defendant calls a friend to the stand. The 
friend testifies that he saw the defendant at a local bar on the night 
53. The personal knowledge requirement may thus reflect a belief that a witness 
is less likely to repeat another person's statement if he knows from his own observa-
tions that the statement is false. 
54. See text at notes 34 & 39-46 supra. 
55. Since the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Fifth Circuit has 
examined the certainty of making factor with respect to the substantive admissibility 
under rule 803 (24) of prior inconsistent statements not meeting the stricter require-
ments of rule 80l(d)(l)(A). Rule 803(24) authorizes substantive admission of 
hearsay statements not included within any specific exception if notice of their in-
tended use is given and they possess "equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trust-
worthiness" and meet certain additional requirements regarding probative value. See 
note 44 supra. In United States v. Leslie, 542 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1976), discussed 
in note 44 supra, the Fifth Circuit upheld the substantive admissibility of prior writ-
ten statements of three witnesses who at trial denied the truth of parts of their state-
ments and claimed lapse of memory with respect to other parts. The court, after dis-
cussing the various indicia of reliability, stated that, "[p]erhaps most significantly, 
for all practical purposes they admitted making the statements." 542 F.2d at 290. 
The court distinguished United States v. Sisto, 534 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1976), an 
earlier Fifth Circuit case that denied substantive admission to a witness' prior incon-
sistent statement, as follows: 
These factors distinguish this case from United States v. Sisto, . . . in which 
we held that the trial court had committed plain error by failing to instruct the 
jury that prior statements allegedly made by the defendant's accomplice were ad-
missible for impeachment only. In Sisto the only evidence that the statements 
were made was the testimony of a government agent. The alleged declarant cat-
egorically denied having made the statements, and there was no evidence of a 
writing or transcription. The House Judiciary Committee was no doubt con-
cerned about exactly this problem of a possible "manufactured" prior statement 
being used against a criminal defendant when it rejected rule 801(d)(l) as pro-
posed by the Supreme Court. Once a witness has admitted making the prior 
statement and only disputes the truth of its contents, however, there is no prob-
lem of a contrived extrajudicial statement getting before the jury for use as sub-
stantive evidence. 
542 F.2d at 291 n.6 (emphasis original). 
56. 4 WEINSTEIN, supra note 10, ,m 80l(d)(l)(A)[03]-801(d)(l)(A}[08]; Falk-
nor, supra note 10, at 54. 
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of the offense, that the defendant did not say anything to him at that 
time, and that he appeared in normal health and was not carrying 
anything. Assume further that the prosecution possesses a written 
statement by the friend that concerns the night in question. While 
on the stand, the friend admits having written and signed the state-
ment, though he denies its factual accuracy. Under the proposals 
discussed above involving personal knowledge, a prior inconsistent 
statement contained in the friend's written declaration to the effect 
that the defendant had admitted robbing the bank would not be ad-
missible as substantive evidence, since the friend had no personal 
knowledge of the matter dealt with in the prior inconsistent state-
ment. 57 Conversely, a prior inconsistent statement in the friend's 
declaration to the effect that when the defendant entered the bar 
he was very sweaty and out of breath, was wearing a torn shirt, 
and was carrying a brown paper bag would be substantively admis-
sible, since the friend's prior inconsistent statement sufficiently 
demonstrates his personal knowledge of the matters stated. 58 
Both the McCormick proposal and the English statute would 
keep from the jury the first prior inconsistent statement in our ex-
ample. This type of statement-the "double hearsay" statement, 
typified by the admission-confession of the criminal defendant-is 
the kind of evidence that has most concerned the judicial system, 50 
for it raises the greatest danger of misapplication by the jury and 
the greatest risk of total fabrication by the witness. 60 Under either 
57. Double hearsay statements are substantively admissible only if there exists an 
exception to the hearsay rule at each level. See FED. R. Evm. 805. 
58. See FED. R. Evm. 602. 
59. In United States v. Briggs, 457 F.2d 908, 910 n.3 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 
U.S. 986 (1972), a case involving the impeachment by a prior inconsistent statement 
of a turncoat informer called by the defendant, Judge Friendly stated: "As we 
pointed out in Cunningham, it is true that the statements would be admissible as af-
firmative evidence under Rule 801(d) (1) of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence. 
. . . This case affords another illustration how dangerous such a rule would be." 
60. The practical difficulties faced by the criminal defendant in opposing the use 
of an alleged oral inconsistent statement are well stated in 4 WEINSTEIN, supra note 
10, 1f 80l(d)(l)(A)[05] n.4: 
Most instances in federal criminal cases as the rule was adopted by the Su-
preme Court would have pitted the witness against an FBI agent who inter-
viewed the witness while accompanied by a colleague and made a report on the 
essentials of the story. In such a swearing contest the witness will almost al-
ways be at a disadvantage so far as the jury is concerned. Even should there 
be some discrepancies between the FBI report and an agent's testimony, the use 
of the report-available as [§ 18 U.S.C.] 3500 material-will generally tend to 
support the agent's credibility because it will indicate that a contemporaneous 
memorandum was made. The agent on redirect will be able to explain that the 
report did not contain all the details and that the regular Bureau practice is to 
destroy original notes when the typed report is prepared. The realities of the 
situation explain why defense counsel and members of Congress were so opposed 
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of the foregoing proposals, only "first-hand hearsay" would be admis-
sible;61 admission-confessions, the least reliable and most damaging 
evidence to the criminal defendant, 62 would not be admitted as sub-
to the rule as adopted by the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, it is probably true 
that the jury is more apt to arrive at a sound factual determination if it is given 
as much available data as possible, including evidence of what a key witness said 
on prior occasions. 
With respect to state court proceedings, the trustworthiness of the police officers is 
even more subject to question. 
Moreover, the risk of fabrication and distortion is significantly increased when a 
witness purports merely to repeat another's out-of-court declaration. It is always 
easier to say that X said something than to report personal observations of the event. 
Even if X did in fact tell the witness something, it would not be unusual for the per-
son asserting to have overheard the out-of-court declaration to inject, intentionally 
or otherwise, additional or different statements into the conversation. Unfortunately, 
these fabricated or distorted statements will often be highly damaging admissions or 
confessions not easily discounted by the jury. 
The party opposing the truth of the prior out-of-court declaration containing a 
second-level hearsay declaration is in a particularly difficult position. The witness 
who is asserted to have repeated the second-level hearsay declaration could deny hav-
ing made any such statement and deny ever having heard the alleged second-level 
statement. Such later denial is not particularly forceful, however, especially if the 
declarant must admit contact with the person to whom the second-level statement is 
attributed. If, on the other hand, personal knowledge is required, the witness can 
do much more than offer a simple denial. He can testify about what he actually per-
ceived, or, if he perceived nothing, explain that, for example, he could not have seen 
anything because he was in California on the day of the event. Note the discourage-
ment to the purported hearer of the witness' out-of-court declaration to fabricate the 
existence of the statement or to add second-level embellishments. One is much less 
likely to fabricate what the in-court witness allegedly perceived and stated than to 
fabricate what the in-court witness allegedly heard and repeated. Often a police-
man will testify that "[t]he witness told me that John told him that he robbed the 
store." If the witness knows John, the jury could mistakenly give credibility to the 
story, since it is far from implausible and extremely difficult for the witness to refute. 
In sum, the increased risk both of fabrication and of faulty recollection, together 
with the limitations on effective cross-examination, warrant general exclusion of sec-
ond-level hearsay statements pursuant to rule 801(d)(l)(A). At the same time, situ-
ations may exist in which a prior inconsistent statement not meeting the requirements 
of rule 801(d)(l)(A) should be admitted substantively pursuant to rule 803(24). 
See, e.g., United States v. Leslie, 542 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1976), discussed in note 
55 supra. For example, assume the defendant's mother voluntarily goes to a police 
station and gives a tape-recorded statement that her son had just told her that he had 
found his wife in bed with the milkman and that he was going to kill both of them. 
She asks the police to stop her son. The mother's statement, even though containing 
second-level hearsay about which the mother lacks personal knowledge, should be 
found admissible in a murder prosecution against her son pursuant to rule 803(24), 
even if she denies making it while testifying in court. 
61. Statement of Lord Chancellor on the second reading of the Bill for the Act 
of Lords, Civil Evidence Act, 1968, c. 64, § 2, whose forerunner was § 1 of Evidence 
Act of 1938, 288 H. of L. OFF. REP. 1341, 1342. See FED. R. Evm. 805, permitting 
double-level hearsay if an exception exists for each level. The requirement of per-
sonal knowledge gives the declarant an opportunity to state either what he now al-
leges to have seen or that, having not even been at the location indicated in the prior 
inconsistent statement at the time alleged, he saw nothing. This statement is a far 
more effective rebuttal than a mere denial by the witness that someone else said 
something to him. 
62. See notes 59 & 60 supra. Pursuant to rule 801(d)(l)(A) as enacted, a state-
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stantive evidence even if the alleged admission is contained in a 
signed statement of the in-court witness, unless the declarant also 
had personal knowledge of the underlying event. 
The foregoing proposals would also exclude from substantive evi-
dence an unacknowledged oral statement, the prior statement most 
likely not to have been made and most likely, if made, to have been 
unfairly obtained or inaccurately reported. With respect to written 
statements63 substantively admissible under each of these proposals 
when made by a witness possessing personal knowledge of the event 
related, it is undeniable that subtle influence, coercion, or deception 
may have affected the process of taking and recording the state-
ment. 64 However, the circumstances surrounding the actual making 
of the statement may be explained by the witness to the trier of fact, 
.and the declarant may provide the trier of fact with a complete ex-
planation of why the statement is misleading, inaccurate, or incor-
rect. 65 Moreover, and critically important, the witness possessing 
personal knowledge of the event related is in a position to advise 
the trier of fact of what he now contends actually occurred. The 
jury may observe the demeanor of the witness throughout. 00 Effec-
tive cross-examination by counsel opposing the truth of the prior in-
consistent statement can be expected to do no more; it rarely accom-
plishes as much. 67 
ment by anyone concerning the defendant's confession would be admissible, in spite 
of the declarant's lack of personal knowledge, if it were given to a grand jury or at 
a prior trial. For a discussion of whether the formality of the making of the state-
ment is an adequate reason to dispense with the personal knowledge requirement, see 
notes 25, 68 & 74 infra. 
63. Many out-of-court declarations are admissible under the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence without regard to whether they are oral or in writing. Present sense impres-
sions (FED. R. Evm. 803(1)), excited utterances (FED, R. Evm. 803(2)), and state-
ments for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment (FED. R. Evm. 803 ( 4)) are 
examples. Moreover, none of these require that the declarant be available and thus 
be subject to cross-examination. Admittedly, these exceptions to the hearsay rule are 
based on certain presumptions about the certainty of making or accuracy of reporting 
of the statements to which they apply. 
64. See note 25 supra. 
65. FED. R. EVID. 613(b) provides: 
Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is not ad• 
missible unless the witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the 
same and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate him there-
on, or the interests of justice otherwise require. This provision does not apply 
to admissions of a party-opponent as defined in rule 801 (d){2). 
See section ill infra. 
66. The jury will have two opportunities for such observation: when the witness 
testifies to the authenticity of the prior inconsistent statement and when he is cross-
examined about that testimony. 
61. See notes 16-17 supra and accompanying text. 
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In short, the difficulty with rule 801(d)(l)(A) is not that it fails 
to permit substantive admission of all prior inconsistent statements, 
but rather that it fails to admit many statements that almost certainly 
were made and that may be explored for truthfulness through subse-
quent cross-examination. The McCormick and English proposals 
broaden admissibility beyond rule 801 (d)(l)(A)'s limitation to state-
ments made at formal proceedings. Yet each, assisted by the require-
ment of personal knowledge, ensures to a sufficient degree of certainty 
that the statements were made and are trustworthy; at the same time, 
both exclude the most untrustworthy declaration, the unacknow-
ledged oral statement. Accordingly, it is suggested that rule 
80I(d)(l)(A) be amended to state: 
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay 
if: 
( 1) Prior Statement of Witness. The declarant testifies at the 
trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning 
the statement, and 
(A) The statement is inconsistent with his testimony, and (i) 
is proved to have been made under oath subject to penalty 
of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding or in a 
deposition, or (ii) is made by a declarant having per-
sonal knowledge of the event or condition the statement 
narrates, describes, . or explains and ( 1 ) the statement is 
proved to have been written or signed by the declarant, 
or (2) the making of the statement is acknowledged to 
have been made either (a) by the declarant in his testi-
mony in the present proceeding or (b) by the declarant 
under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hear-
ing, or other proceeding or in a deposition, or (3) the state-
ment is proved to have been accurately recorded by a tape 
recorder, videotape recording, or any other similar elec-
tronic means of sound recording. 68 -
68. The proposal does not extend the personal knowledge requirement to state-
ments now admissible pursuant to rule 801(d)(l)(A) primarily because that require-
ment has never been incorporated as part of the common-law hearsay exception for 
former testimony, an exception closely paralleling rule 801(d)(l)(A)'s reference to 
testimony and depositions. Moreover, while the same arguments put forth in the Arti-
cle are applicable to such prior inconsistent statements, additional indications of ab-
solute reliability are provided by the formality and, in some cases, public nature of 
the prior proceeding. With respect to statements concededly made, such formality 
does significantly reduce the effect of outside influence, coercion, see note 74 infra, 
and deception, see text at note 76 infra. In any event, application of the personal 
knowledge requirement to such prior statement would certainly not be unacceptable. 
As previously noted, note 45 supra, Uniform Rule of Evidence 801(d)(l)(A) 
permits substantive admissibility of all prior inconsistent statements in civil proceed-
ings. While the proposal made in this Article does not differentiate between civil 
and criminal proceedings, the reduced practical effect of blanket substantive admissi-
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Certain prov1S1ons of the proposed rule deserve specific men-
tion. 0° Current federal rule 80l(d)(l)(A) does not permit 
substantive admissibility when a witness at trial acknowledges the 
making but denies the truth of the inconsistent statement; in contrast 
801(d)(l)(A)(ii)(2)(a) of the proposed rule would give substantive ad-
missibility to this inconsistent statement. In addition, 80l(d)(l) 
(A)(ii)(2)(b) of the proposed rule provides the possibility of sub-
stantive admissibility for a prior oral or written statement the making 
of which the witness had acknowledged while testifying at a prior 
trial, hearing, other proceeding, or deposition, even if the witness 
had denied its truth at that proceeding. Thus, subject to the require-
ment of personal knowledge, if a witness at a current trial had earlier 
appeared at one of these formal proceedings and there had stated 
that he had made a particular oral statement, under the proposal the 
statement would be admissible substantively in the present trial if 
it is inconsistent with his present trial testimony, even if he now states 
that he never made the prior statement or that it was untrue. 
The proposal also requires that the statement be "proved" to 
have been made whenever the witness refuses to acknowledge that 
he made it. It is envisaged that resolution of that issue would be 
in the province of the court. This determination is not intended 
merely to come under rule 104(b),70 under which the court would only 
need to find that sufficient evidence had been introduced to support 
a jury finding that the out-of-court statement was made. Rather, 
the litigant seeking to use as substantive evidence a prior inconsistent 
statement that the witness had not admitted making must initially 
convince the court by a preponderance of the evidence that the state-
ment was in fact made. 71 Of course, given the nature of the prior 
inconsistent statements that fall within the proposed rule, it is prob-
able that the witness will seldom deny making the statement, 72 al-
bility in civil cases coupled with the simplification such admissibility would accom-
plish with respect to problems addressed in rules 613 and 607 makes the Uniform 
Rules' treatment of civil proceedings an acceptable if not preferable alternative. 
69. Substantive effect is given to statements accurately recorded mechanically; 
stenographic transcripts that are not taken as part of a trial, hearing, proceeding, or 
deposition and that are unexecuted by the declarant are not included. Cf. Bridges 
v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945) ·(construing the regulations of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service on admissibility of evidence). 
70. FED. R. Evm. 104(b): "Relevancy conditioned on fact. When the relevancy 
of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit 
it upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of 
the fulfillment of the condition." 
71. Ultimately, of course, the jury must determine if the statement was actually 
made. See also Comment, supra note 45, at 1388-89. 
72. If the actual making of these statements is disputed, proof of making by a 
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though the possibility of forged signatures on or alterations in 
prior signed statements creates a potential for dispute over whether 
such statements were made. 73 
Since an in-court declarant who denies making a prior inconsis-
tent statement will necessarily be testifying under oath, the proposal 
is justified in imposing a greater requirement of certainty that he 
made the statement-accomplished by placing on the proponent of 
the out-of-court declaration the burden of proof by a preponderance 
of the evidence-than governs the admission of other disputed writ-
ings. Such direct testamentary contradiction is often not present 
with respect to authentication of writings admitted pursuant to the 
doctrine of conditional relevance. Moreover, the trier of fact, recog-
nizing that witnesses often lack a party's interest in the outcome of 
the litigation, tends to value highly the testimony of the occurrence 
witness. Accordingly, although a written admission introduced into 
evidence pursuant to current federal rule 801(d)(2) would be ad-
mitted under the proposed rule upon a judicial determination that 
sufficient evidence exists to support a subsequent jury finding that 
the witness actually made the statement, testimony of the ocurrence 
witness is potentially so persuasive, especially in criminal proceed-
ings, that more probative evidence that a prior inconsistent statement 
was actually made must be introduced before it may be presented to 
the jury for substantive consideration. 
The proposed amendment to rule 80l(d)(l)(A) also requires 
that, in order for the prior inconsistent statement to be admissible, 
the proponent must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the statement alleged to be that of the declarant was the exact state-
ment that he had written or signed. The proponent of the prior 
statement should not be required to bear this burden of proof regard-
ing admissibility for other facts about the statement, however. The 
special problems of distortion through subtle wording variations, 
complete omissions, fabricated additions followed by uncritical sign-
ing, or subtle influence or appeal to the declarant's desire to please 
another person are resolved by the jury after it has heard the prob-
lems explained by the in-court declarant and explored by the cross-
examination of the person who took the written statement. The 
jury, consistent with its traditional function, is assigned the tasks of 
preponderance of the evidence will normally be accomplished as part of the process 
of authentication. See generally United States v. Leslie, 542 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 
1976). 
73. See note 25 supra, 
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judging the credibility of each witness and of deciding what in fact 
occurred when the prior statement was allegedly made. Thus, once 
the court is persuaded by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
prior statement was in fact written or signed by the witness, it need 
make no determination of any other facts relating to the statement, 
for evaluation of the circumstances surrounding the making of the 
statement is left to the jury. 
Finally, if the declarant in either a civil or criminal case asserts 
that a prior statement was made involuntarily,74 under the proposed 
rule the proponent of the statement would be required to convince 
the judge by a preponderance of the evidence that the statement had 
not been the product of coercion. 75 In this regard, it is noteworthy 
74. The question of the voluntariness of the prior inconsistent statement was 
faced in LaFrance v. Bohlinger, 499 F.2d 29 (1st Cir. 1974). The case involved the 
question whether a witness' prior out-of-court statement inculpating the defendant 
could be used solely for purposes of impeachment without a judicial determination 
that the statement was voluntarily made. The court concluded that a preliminary 
hearing on voluntariness was constitutionally mandated, relying in part on Napue v. 
Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959): "The principle that a State may not knowingly 
use false evidence, including false testimony, to obtain a tainted conviction, implicit 
in any concept of ordered liberty, does not cease to apply merely because the false 
testimony goes only to the credibility of the witness." 
The problem of police coercion of witnesses to obtain statements must be faced 
squarely. Unfortunately, the proposed substantive admissibility of witnesses' incon-
sistent signed or written statements may increase police use of this tactic. Even with-
out such substantive admissibility and despite the discouragement of the voucher rule, 
see text at notes 133-46 infra, police officers upon occasion have apparently 
coerced statements from witnesses. See Bradford v. Johnson, 354 F. Supp. 1331 
(E.D. Mich. 1972), aftd., 416 F.2d 66 (6th Cir. 1973); People v. Underwood, 61 
Cal. 2d 113, 389 P.2d 937, 37 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1964); but see People v. Bates, 
25 Ill. App. 3d 748, 324 N.E.2d 88 (1975). 
75. The right of confrontation, of course, applies to prior inconsistent statements 
placed in evidence against the criminal defendant. See generally Davenport, The 
Confrontation Clause and the Co-Conspirator Exception in Criminal Prosecutions: 
A Functional Analysis, 85 HARV, L. REV. 1378 (1972); Griswold, The Due Process 
Revolution and Confrontation, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 711 (1971); Read, The New Con-
frontation-Hearsay Dilemma, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1972); Semerjian, The Right of 
Confrontation, 55 A.B.A.J. 152 (1969); Silbert, supra note 10. 
For a general discussion of confrontation issues raised when a witness admits, de-
nies, or does not recall either the making or substance of a prior inconsistent state-
ment, see 4 WEINSTEIN, supra note 10, ,m 80l(d)(l)(A)[0l]-801(d)(l)(A)[08], 
Given the requirements of the proposed rule, it seems very unlikely that a witness 
will in fact deny making the statement. If the witness does admit making the state-
ment, he may either affirm or deny the truth of its contents or deny recollection of 
the underlying events. If its truth is affirmed, the prior statement has become cur-
rent testimony and will be given substantive effect. See 4 WEINSTEIN, supra note 10, 
801(d)(l)(A)[02]. If the statement's truth is denied, the prior statement may 
also be given substantive effect pursuant to California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970). 
If the witness denies knowledge or memory of the underlying event, the court must 
decide whether the witness' "apparent la_pse of memory so affected [the defendant's] 
right to cross-examination as to make a critical difference in the application of the 
Confrontation Clause." 399 U.S. at 168. In reaching this question upon remand in 
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that the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard has already been 
applied in criminal cases to determine the voluntariness of a prior 
inconsistent statement. 76 
Ill. RULE 613-THE FOUNDATION REQUIREMENT 
Rule 613, as drafted by the Advisory Committee, approved by 
the Supreme Court, and adopted by Congress, constitutes a major 
departure from the traditional foundation requirements developed at 
common law and applied in the federal courts. 77 In order to under-
stand the operation of rule 613 and the significant change it repre-
sents, one must first explore the development of the traditional foun-
dation requirements, the most controversial aspects of which are de-
rived from the famous Queen Caroline's Case (hereinafter called 
Queen's Case), decided in England in 1_820.78 
A. The Common-Law Requirements 
I. Inconsistency 
Before a party may attack the credibility of a witness by means 
of a prior statement, it must initially be shown that the prior state-
ment is actually inconsistent with the witness' in-court testimony. 
Thus, if the prior statement is not inconsistent, the law will not per-
mit its use for impeachment, and no question of proper foundation 
for the introduction of extrinsic proof arises. 
The degree of inconsistency required for impeachment has not 
escaped the controversy that generally surrounds the foundation re-
quirement. Some jurisdictions have followed a strict test of incon-
sistency by narrowly construing the meaning of the statements and 
Green, the California Supreme Court, after noting the witness' recollection of events 
both before and after the alleged event in question, concluded that the witness' "de-
liberate evasion of the latter point in his trial testimony must be deemed to constitute 
an implied denial that" defendant committed the offense in question,. 3 Cal. 3d 981, 
989, 479 P.2d 998, 1002, 92 Cal. Rptr. 494, 498 (1971). After analyzing the three-
fold purpose of confrontation-to insure reliability, to expose the witness to cross-
examination, and to allow the trier of fact to observe the witness' demeanor-the 
court found that purpose fulfilled and the right to confrontation satisfied. 
76. See La France v. Bohlinger, 499 F.2d 29 (1st Cir. '1974). See generally 
United States v. Leslie, 542 F.2d 285, 291 (5th Cir. 1976), discussed in notes 44 
& 55 supra, which upheld the substantive admission of prior inconsistent statements 
while not explicitly considering the burden of proof and ruling that contentions as 
to the declarants' expectations of favorable treatment and drugged condition pre-
sented questions of credibility only. 
77. For the text of rule 613, see text at note 113 infra. 
78. 129 Eng. Rep. 976 (1820). See generally Stern & Grosh, A Visit with Queen 
Caroline: Her Trial and Its Rule, 6 CAP. U.L. REv. 165 (1976). 
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by resolving doubts in favor of the witness.79 McCormick, on the 
other hand, suggested that the test should be as follows: "[C]ould 
the jury reasonably find that a witness who believed the truth of the 
facts testified to would have been unlikely to make a prior statement 
of this type?"80 Wigmore proposed a similarly liberal test: "Do the 
two expressions appear to have been produced by inconsistent be-
liefs?"81 
Federal courts have tended to agree with the statements of 
McCormick and Wigmore.82 For example, in United States v. 
Barrett, 83 the court held that a witness' testimony that the defendant 
had admitted his involvement in the crime was inconsistent with the 
same witness' alleged statement that it was too bad the defendant 
had been indicted because he knew the defendant was not involved. 
The trial court had excluded the prior statement, ruling that it was 
not inconsistent but was rather a "hearsay opinion . . . that this guy 
is innocent."84 The First Circuit, however, found the two state-
ments inconsistent and reversed, stating: 
To be received as a prior inconsistent statement, the contradiction 
need not be in plain terms. It is enough if the proffered testimony, 
taken as a whole, either by what it says or by what it omits to say, 
affords some indication that the·fact was different from the testimony 
of the witness whom it is sought to contradict. . . . Furthermore, 
the fact that [the witness'] belief that [the defendant] was not in-
volved might be called an "opinion" is immaterial. . . . The impor-
tant point is the clear incompatibility between [the witness'] direct 
testimony and the. alleged statement. 85 
2. The Foundation Requirement 
Although the traditional foundation rule as s~t out in the 
Queen's Case applied to -both written and oral prior inconsistent 
19. See, e.g., Sanger v. Bacon, 180 Ind. 322, 328, 101 N.E. 1001, 1003 (1913). 
See also Ladd, Some Observations on Credibility: Impeachment of Witnesses, 52 
CORNELL L.Q. 239, 253 (1967) (citation omitted): 
A final observation about the limitations on impeaching statements is that 
the degree of inconsistency must be real. When the statements are placed side 
by side, it must be possible to say that both cannot be true. Only in this cir-
cumstance will the triers have reason to nullify the testimony given in court, 
which is the only justification for the admissibility of the out-of-court statement. 
80. EVIDENCE, supra note 12, ,§ 34, at 68. 
81. 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 1040, at 1048. 
82. See United States v. Morgan, 555 F.2d 238, 242 (9th Cir. 1977) (approving 
the liberal view of inconsistency under the Federal Rules of Evidence). 
83. 539 F.2d 244 (1st Cir. 1976). 
84. 539 F.2d at 254. 
85. 539 F.2d at 254. 
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statements., the specific requirements established for each were not 
the same. The basic rule, which applied to all prior inconsistent 
statements whether oral or written, required that a party intending 
to impeach a witness with extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent 
statement must first ask the witness upon cross-examination whether 
he had made the prior statement and then must permit the witness 
to admit, deny, or explain it.86 In later cases, the foundation re-
quirement was refined to require that time, place, and persons 
present, as well as the content of the prior statement, also be 
specified.87 The rationale of the rule was essentially threefold: (1) 
to save time, since an admission by the witness that the statement 
was his own might make the introduction of extrinsic evidence un-
necessary; (2) to avoid unfair surprise to the adversary, by alerting 
him to the possible existence of a prior inconsistent statement and 
thus enabling him to prepare to meet the issue; and (3) to prevent 
unfairness to the witness, by permitting him to explain or deny an 
apparent inconsistency at the time it was first suggested. 88 
The Queen's Case established the additional requirement that, 
before a witness could be examined about the contents of a writing 
that allegedly contained a prior inconsistent statement, the document 
itself had to be shown to the witness or its contents read to him. 
This rule was based on a rather dubious application of the best evi-
dence rule: the court in the Queen's Case stated that "the contents 
of every written paper are, according to ordinary and well-established 
rules of evidence, to be proved by the paper itself, and by that alone, 
if the paper be in existence."89 Many courts applying the rule of 
the Queen's Case .forbade even questions designed to lay a foundation 
for the written statement unless the witness was first shown the docu-
ment, and such disclosure thus came to be an integral part of the 
foundation required for the introduction into evidence of a prior in-
consistent written statement. Clearly, however, the rule was also 
more than a simple foundation requirement, for its prohibitions arose 
not when extrinsic evidence of the prior written statement was offered, 
86. The Queen's Case, 129 Eng. Rep. at 987-88; The Charles Morgan, 115 U.S. 
69 (1885). See Hale, Impeachment of Witnesses by Prior Inconsistent Statements, 
10 S. CAL. L. R.Ev. 135 (1937); Ladd, supra note 79. 
87. Crowley v. Page, 173 Eng. Rep. 344 (1837); Angus v. Smith, 173 Eng. Rep. 
1228 (1829). 
88. See McCORMICK, supra note 10, § 37, at 72. 
89. 129 Eng. Rep. at 977. For a criticism of the court's analysis, see 4 J. WIG-
MORE, supra note 10, § 1260; Hale, supra note 86, at 147-49 & n.60. 
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but rather when any question concerning the statement was put to 
the witness on cross-examination. 
Commentators have strongly criticized the requirement that a 
witness must be shown his prior written statement before any cross-
examination commences concerning its contents. Wigmore termed 
the requirement "a rule which for unsoundness of principle, im-
propriety of policy, and practical inconvenience in trials [is] the 
most notable mistake that can be found among the rulings upon the 
present subject."90 Others have echoed that judgment, emphasizing 
that showing the prior written statement to the witness on cross-
examination may warn the dissembling witness or refresh the memory 
of the witness who is forgetful, thereby screening such infirmities 
from the jury's inspection. One commentator has phrased the 
objection as follows: 
Grant the argument of the judges that a letter or other writing is the 
best evidence of its contents and that therefore a witness should not 
be questioned to give his version of the letter's contents from 
memory, if it is desired to prove what the letter says. But there are 
nevertheless many cases in which the purpose of the questioning is 
not to prove the contents of the letter, but rather to test the credibil-
ity of the witness. If a witness has claimed to remember the details 
of an event, but relates falsely what he wrote in a letter associated 
with the event, that fact diminishes the trust which might be attached 
to his memory. Similarly, if the witness falsely denied writing a par-
ticular letter, or lies about what he wrote, that fact obviously is evi-
dence that he is likely to be lying in other parts of his testimony about 
related matters. But if the rule in the Queen's Case is followed, and 
it is required that the witness first be shown or read the letter, this 
valuable chance to test his memory and veracity is lost. A forgetful 
witness will have his memory of the letter refreshed or corrected, 
though his memory for the rest of his testimony remains faulty. A 
lying witness will discover the matters on which he may safely lie and 
those in which he must equivocate, thus guarding the lie from discov-
ery. 91 
B. Prior Federal Practice: Foundation and 
Extrinsic Evidence 
Although the federal courts accepted in principle the foundation 
, 1 • 90. 4 J. WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 1259. McCormick also criticized dogmatic 
•• 1 ; 1 .~pplication of the rule, but he would have allowed the trial judge discretion to apply 
. . . , it in order to prevent counsel from abusing cross-examination to induce the forgetful 
, , 1 , witness to widen the gap between his testimony and his prior written statement. EVI• 
DENCE, supra note 12, § 28. 
91. Stern & Grosh, supra note 78, at 198. Of course, the process of discovery has 
significantly reduced the likelihood that the witness will in fact be surprised and thus 
be dramatically confronted with an alleged prior inconsistent writing. The issue of 
fairness to the witness would thus seem to have little practical significance. 
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rule established in the Queen's CO§e, in practice they never consid-
ered themselves bound by its technical requirements. In The 
Charles Morgan,92 an 1885 case, the Supreme Court did note with 
approval the foundation requirements applicable to prior inconsistent 
oral and written statements. However, the Court suggested that, al-
though the requirement that a witness be shown a prior inconsistent 
written statement before any cross-examination can begin concern-
ing its contents was "ordinarily" applicable, the rule might be ig-
nored in certain situations. The Court stated that "[c]ircumstances 
may arise, however, which will excuse [the document's] production. 
All the law requires is that the memory of the witness shall be so 
refreshed by the necessary inquiries as to enable him to explain, if 
he can and desires to do so."93 Later courts generally accepted that 
statement as a presentation of the ordinary rule rather than as an 
exception thereto, and therefore they did not require that the prior 
written statement actually be shown to the witness so long as the 
witness had an opportunity to explain the inconsistency. For ex-
ample, in United States v. Dilliard,94 the defendant complained that 
the prosecution had used a letter he had written to impeach him 
without first allowing him to see it. Affirming the defendant's con-
viction, Judge Learned Hand, speaking for the Second Circuit, ad-
mitted that the rule of the Queen's Case had been broken, but held 
that, although the Supreme Court in The Charles Morgan had 
countenanced the rule, it had 
scarcely accepted [the rule] as preemptory .... It was reversed 
by legislation in England, and is everywhere more honored in the 
breach than in the observance. Fairness usually does require that 
the witness shall be told when and where he made the putatively con-
tradictory statement; but that is really all that the Supreme Court has 
ever exacted, and we think more is not necessary.95 
The federal rule that ultimately developed did retain the require-
ment that, before the introduction of extrinsic evidence of a prior 
oral or written inconsistent statement, the witness must be con-
92. 115 U.S. 69 (1885). 
93. 115 U.S. at 77-78. 
94. 101 F.2d 829 (2d Cir. 1938). 
95. 101 F.2d at 837. See also United States v. Hibler, 463 F.2d 455, 462 (9th 
Cir. 1972) (trial judge's exclusion of cross-examination of a witness concerning prior 
trial testimony without showing the witness copies of prior testimony transcript held 
error); United States v. Bernstein, 417 F.2d 641, 644 (2d Cir. 1969) ("all that fair-
ness requires is that the witness be told when and where he made the putatively con-
tradictory statement"); Wright Root Beer Co. v. Dr. Pepper Co., 414 F.2d 887, 891 
(5th Cir. 1969) (error to permit witness to hold copy of deposition in his hand dur-
ing cross-examination). 
1598 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 75:1565 
fronted with its contents so that he could admit, deny, or explain.00 
Most courts did not strictly enforce the "time, place, and persons 
present" aspect of the traditional rule, generally requiring only that 
the witness' attention be sufficiently directed to the circumstances 
surrounding the making of the prior inconsistent statement so that 
he could admit, deny, or explain.07 Although the federal courts had 
stated that at the very least the witness had to be given this oppor-
tunity to explain the inconsistency,98 they never required that the 
impeaching cross-examiner himself actually provide it. So long as 
the court permitted counsel on redirect to elicit an explanation, the 
96. See The Charles Morgan, 115 U.S. 69, 77 (1885): 
The rule is, that the contradictory declarations of a witness, whether oral or in 
writing, made at another time, cannot be used for the purpose of impeachment 
until the witness has been examined upon the subject, and his attention particu-
larly directed to the circumstances in such a way as to give him full opportunity 
for explanation or exculpation, if he desires to make it. 
The witness' explanation of the inconsistency might take several forms-for example, 
that the prior statement was coerced, e.g., United States v. Scandifia, 390 F.2d 244, 
250-51 (2d Cir. 1968), vacated on other grounds, 394 U.S. 310 (1969), that the re-
port of his prior statement is inaccurate, or that the inconsistency is not significant. 
One means advocated by Wigmore, see 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 1045, and 
specifically recognized in FED. R. Evm. 106 is to introduce such other portions of 
the writing as are necessary to explain the inconsistency. 
97. See Brooks v. United States, 309 F.2d 580, 582 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 
383 U.S. 916 (1966) ("it is necessary that the prior statements be called to his atten-
tion, and that he be given an opportunity to admit, deny, or explain them"). United 
States v. Dilliard, 101 F.2d 829, 837 (2d Cir. 1939) ("[f]aimess usually does require 
that the witness shall be told when and where he made the putatively contradictory 
statement"). But see Robertson v. MIS Sanyo Maru, 374 F.2d 463, 465 (5th Cir. 
1967), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854 (1970) ("the cross-examiner should ask the witness 
whether he made the statement, giving its substance, naming the time, the place, and 
the person to whom made"); Sylvester v. Meditz, 278 F. Supp. 810, 813 (E.D. Wis. 
1968) (''The proper procedure for laying a foundation for impeachment by prior 
inconsistent statements made orally is to call the attention of the witness to the par-
ticular time and occasion when the witness purportedly made the statement. The 
witness should be informed what the statements were and the conditions and circum-
stances under which they were made."); Osborn v. McEwan, 194 F. Supp. '117, 118 
(D.D.C. 1961) ("[t]he interrogation on cross-examination must identify the specific 
statement and indicate its contents, the occasion, and the person to whom it was 
alleged to have been made"). See also 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 1029: 
If the preliminary question is to be useful as a warning to enable the witness 
to prepare to disprove the utterance or to explain it away if admitted, it must 
usually specify some details as to the occasion of the remark. The witness may 
perhaps without this understand the occasion alluded to; but usually he will not, 
and in such a case this specification of the details is a mere dictate of justice. 
The tendency of American courts, however, is to lose sight of the fact that this 
specification is a mere means to an end (namely, the end of adequately warning 
the witness), and to treat it as an inherent requisite, whether the witness really 
understood the allusion or not. The result of this is that unless the counsel re-
peats a particular arbitrary formula of question, he loses the use of his evidence, 
without regard to the substantial adequacy of the warning. Such a practice is 
impolitic and unjustified by principle. 
98. See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 489 F.2d 1181, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1973); 
cases cited in notes 99-100 infra. 
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rule was deemed satisfied. 99 However, the federal courts did strictly 
enforce a requirement that the opportunity for such explanation must 
occur before the introduction of extrinsic evidence.100 
An additional component of the foundation rule that developed 
in the federal courts, the good-faith-basis requirement, prevented 
counsel from making unwarranted insinuations that a witness had 
made a prior inconsistent statement. This requirement vested the 
court with discretion to demand the assurance of counsel that he 
could support the foundation question of whether the witness had 
made a prior statement with evidence of the alleged statement.101 
In United States v. Bohle,102 the court stated the rule as follows: 
Where a trial judge is aware of the possibility that counsel intends 
to ask an impeaching question having prejudicial implications, it is 
proper and advisable, in the interests of avoiding abuse and of insur-
ing a fair trial to both the prosecution and the defendant, that the 
judge inquire of counsel whether the question on which he is about 
to embark is for the purpo~e of impeachment and whether and how 
counsel intends to follow up the question with impeaching proof. If 
there is no intention to introduce such impeaching proof, the question 
may, in the court's discretion, be properly excluded.103 
If a witness responding to the foundation question denied mak-
ing a prior statement, federal courts then required the cross-
99. See generally United States v. Franzese, 392 F.2d 954, 959 (2d Cir. 1968), 
vacated on other grounds, 394 U.S. 310 (1969) (witness explained that he feared 
death or bodily harm); United States v. Scandifia, 390 F.2d 244, 250-51 (2d Cir. 
1968), vacated on other grounds, 394 U.S. 310 (1969) (witness testified that his fam-
ily had received threatening phone calls); Pattison v. Standard Oil Co. of Ohio, 375 
F.2d 643 (6th Cir. 1967) (prejudicial error to deny witness the opportunity to ex-
plain); West v. Greyhound Corp., 254 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1958) (witness may admit 
and explain prior statement); Affronti v. United States, 145 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1944) 
(other portions of prior statement admissible to meet for~ of impeachment). 
100. See United States v. Wright, 489 F.2d 1181, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("[b]e-
fore introducing extrinsic proof of a witness' prior inconsistent statement, the witness 
must be asked whether he or she made the statement and must be given an opportu-
nity to explain it"); United States v. Hayutin, 398 F.2d 944, 953 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 393 U.S. 961 (1963). 
101. See St. Clair v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 279 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1960). 
102. 445 F.2d 54 (7th Cir. 1971). 
103. 445 F.2d at 74. The court in Bohle, however, condemned the practice of 
requiring that counsel reveal to the witness and opposing counsel the specific im-
peaching information, since it gives the witness time to consider his _answer to the 
foundation question and thereby eliminates any reaction of surprise. Referring to the 
trial court's decision to allow confrontation of the witness with his prior statement 
out of the presence of the jury, the Seventh Circuit said: 
Such a practice would appear to have a strong tendency to undermine the func-
tion of confronting the witness with the question in the first place. The loss 
to the jury of the witness' initial and inlmediate response is accompanied by the 
loss of one potentially significant aspect of the credibility determination. In the 
usual case, we can see no point in thus weakening the right to an effective cross-
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examiner to produce extrinsic evidence of the statement.104 A wit-
ness' equivocal answer to the foundation question also required the 
introduction of extrinsic evidence. For example, in Ditrich v. 
United States,105 a witness admitted signing an inconsistent prior 
written statement, but refused to say whether she had in fact made 
the statements contained in the writing. Given those circumstances, 
the court required that the writing itself be introduced.100 If, on 
the other hand, the witness admitted making a prior inconsistent 
statement, the courts did not require that extrinsic evidence of the 
statement be introduced,1°7 and some went so far as to exclude such 
evidence.108 There was, however, no consensus among the courts 
or the commentators about the admissibility of extrinsic evidence 
under these circumstances. In Gordon v. United States,100 the Su-
-preme Court stated that "an admission that a contradiction is con-
tained in a writing should not bar admission of the document itself 
in evidence."110 Wigmore agreed that no valid reason existed to ex-
clude evidence following the witness' admission, and he asserted that 
counsel should be allowed to emphasize the inconsistency .111 
McCormick disagreed, however, advocating what he felt to be the 
prevailing view of excluding extrinsic evidence of an admitted prior 
examination by use of the voir dire procedure. 
445 F.2d at 75. 
104. United States v. Stanfield, 521 F.2d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 1975); United 
_States v. Hibler, 463 F.2d 455, 461 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Bohle, 445 F.2d 
54, 74 (7th Cir. 1971) ("[i]n civil litigation and in the case of the prosecution in 
a criminal case, the duty to follow up foundation with evidence is breached at the 
risk of reversal of any tainted victory"); United States v. Amabile, 395 F.2d 47, 50 
(7th Cir. 1968), vacated on other grounds, 394 U.S. 310 (1969), affd. 011 remand, 
432 F.2d 1115 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 924 (1971); Sidders v. United States, 
381 F.2d 513, 516 (9th Cir. 1967); Robertson v. M/X Sanyo Maru, 374 F.2d 463, 
465 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854 (1970) ("[i]f the witness denies 
the making of the statement or fails to admit it, the cross-examiner must prove the 
making of the alleged statement at his next stage of giving evidence"). 
105. 243 F.2d 729 (10th Cir. 1957). 
106. See also Bush v. United States, 267 F.2d 483, 489 (9th Cir. 1959) (witness 
answered that he "might have said it"); Patterson v. United States, 361 F.2d 632, 
635 (8th Cir. 1966). 
107. United States v. Stanfield, 521 F.2d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 1975); United 
States v. Hibler, 463 F.2d 455, 462 (9th Cir. 1972); Brooks v. United States, 309 
F.2d 580, 582 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 916 (1966). 
108. Dilley v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 327 F.2d 249, 251 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 
379 U.S. 824 (1964) ("where a witness admits a statement attributed to him, there 
is no necessity to prove it and the statement is not admissible in evidence"). 
109. 344 U.S. 414 (1953). 
110. 344 U.S. at 420. See also United States v. Browne, 313 F.2d 197 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 374 U.S. 814 (1963 ). 
111. 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 1037. 
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statement112 in order to save time and minimize the calling of wit-
nesses on subsidiary issues. 
C. The Approach Adopted in Rule 613 
In assessing what foundation requirement to apply to prior state-
ments of witnesses, the Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules 
of Evidence was faced with federal court practice that repudiated 
that aspect of the foundation rule requiring a written statement to 
be shown or read to the witness prior to examination thereon but 
still required a foundation sufficient to allow the witness an ef-
fective opportunity to admit, deny, or explain the alleged prior state-
ment before permitting introduction of extrinsic proof. An analysis 
of this practice led the Advisory Committee to draft-and Congress 
to pass-rule 613, which confirmed much of the existing federal 
practice while also further liberalizing the traditional foundation re-
quirements. The rule provides as follows: 
Prior Statements of Witnesses 
(a) Examining witness concerning prior statement. In examin-
ing a witness concerning a prior statement made by him, whether 
written or not, the statement need not be shown nor its contents dis-
closed to him at that time, but on request the same shall be shown 
or disclosed to opposing counsel. 
(b) Extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statement of witness. 
Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is 
not admissible unless the witness is afforded an opportunity to explain 
or deny the same and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity 
to interrogate him thereon, or the interests of justice otherwise re-
quire. This provision does not apply to admissions of a party-
opponent as defined in rule 80l(d)(2).113 
Although Congress passed rule 613 without substantive 
change, 114 the rule did undergo two significant alterations between 
the time of its first publication in 1969115 and its approval by the 
Advisory Committee and the Supreme Court. 116 Initially, the Ad-
visory Committee substituted "inconsistent" for "contradictory" to 
112. EVIDENCE, supra note 12, § 37, at 73. 
113. FED. R. EVID. 613. 
114. The only modification in rule 613 made by Congress was in the second 
sentence of 613 (a), where Congress substituted "nor" for "or." See Federal Judiciary 
Center's Note on Rule 613, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR UNITED STATES 
COURTS AND MAGISTRATES 75 (West 1975). 
115. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States Dis-
trict Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161, 308-09 (1969). 
1116. The Advisory Committee also made one clarifying change. The committee 
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describe the nature of the prior statements included, a change de-
signed to assure a liberal interpretation of what statements will 
qualify for purposes of impeachment.117- The second-and more 
important-change in rule 613 was the addition of the phrase "or 
the interests of justice otherwise require"118 to 613(b). This modi-
fication permits the trial judge to excuse counsel's inadvertent failure 
to lay a foundation when the witness is unavailable for recall. Fur-
thermore, the .amendment assures that evidence will not be automati-
cally excluded if circumstances develop that deny the witness an op-
portunity to explain the inconsistency. 
Rule 613(a) abolishes once and for all the "useless impediment" 
to cross-examination represented by that portion of the Queen's 
Case requiring a written statement to be shown or read to .a witness 
prior to examination thereon. Instead, rule 613 (a) requires that 
counsel examining a witness concerning a prior oral or written state-
ment disclose, if requested, the contents of the statement to the op-
posing counsel. Although no specific time for such disclosure is 
designated, the requirement of disclosure "upon request" presum-
ably refers to when the witness is being examined about the prior 
statement. 119 In short, rule 613(a) establishes identical foundation 
requirements for examination as to either a witness' prior oral or writ-
ten statement. A good-faith basis is required for this examination, 
enforced by a duty to disclose the content of the statement to op-
posing counsel upon request. However, examination upon the prior 
oral or written statement may proceed without initial disclosure to 
the witness of its contents. 
To illustrate the operation of rule 613(a), let us assume that an 
occurrence witness upon direct examination by plaintiff states that 
he saw the entire .accident and that at the time of the accident the 
added the phrase "at that time" to rule 613(a) following "the statements need not 
be shown or its contents disclosed to him," in order to make it clear that the state-
ment may have to be shown to the witness at some time in order to allow him to 
explain or deny it. The amendment also sought to emphasize that Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 26{b){3), allowing a person to obtain a copy of his own statement, 
was not repealed, though its operation may be temporarily suspended. Advisory 
Committee Note to Proposed Rule 613, 56 F.R.D. 183, 278 (1972). 
117. See 3 WEINSTEIN, supra note 10, ,r 613(01]. 
118. Professor Alex Brooks, chief draftsman of the New Jersey Rules of Evi-
dence, was primarily responsible for the amendment. The phrase was proposed in 
the Report of American College of Trial Lawyers, Committee To Study Proposed 
Rules of Evidence 49 (1970), cited in 3 WEINSTEIN, supra note 7, ,r 613(02] at 613-
7. 
119. Requiring disclosure at the time of the examination may represent a change 
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traffic light facing the defendant's truck was red. Defense counsel 
has in his arsenal two prior inconsistent statements. The first is an 
oral statement by the witness made to police officer Smith. The 
second is a signed statement given to John Brown, an insurance in-
vestigator. Assume further that in both statements the witness is 
alleged to have asserted that he did not see the color of the traffic 
light at the time of the accident, having arrived at the scene about 
twenty seconds after hearing but not observing the impact. In cross-
examination of the witness, defense counsel may employ ( either 
alone or in combination) questions falling within any one of the fol-
lowing categories: 
(1) Cross-examination confronting the witness with other ver-
sions of the facts. For example, "Isn't it true you did not actually 
see the car and truck collide?," or "Didn't you in fact arrive at the 
accident twenty seconds after impact?" 
(2) Cross-examination inquiring about the assurance, frank-
ness, and recollection of the witness. For example, "Have you 
always maintained that position?," or "Did you ever tell a contrary 
story to anyone else?" 
(3) Cross-examination going beyond mere inquiry about assur-
ance of position and clearly implying the existence of a contrary 
statement. For example, "Didn't you talk to John Brown about the 
accident?" 
( 4) Cross-examination confronting the witness with the sub-
stance or exact content of a prior statement, after laying a partial 
but not full prior foundation regarding time, place, and persons 
present. For example, "Didn't you tell Officer Smith a completely 
contrary story?," or "Haven't you said on another occasion that you 
arrived at the scene of the accident twenty seconds after hearing the 
collision?"120 
in practice with respect to statements not already in possession of the opposing party. 
If impeachment is by a document or deposition transcript already in the opponent's 
possession, it is customary, if not required, to specify the document or give the date, 
page, and line of the deposition transcript being used to impeach. With respect to 
written documents not previously discovered, past practice might have required dis-
closure only at the conclusion of cross-examination. Cf. People v. Mulliken, 41 111. 
App. 2d 282, 190 N.E.2d 502 ( 1963) (no right of opposing counsel to inspect tran-
script of oral statements used to lay foundation for impeachment). 
On the introduction of the remainder of writings that in fairness ought to be con-
sidered together, see FED. R. Evm. 106; Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Wray Equip. 
Corp., 286 F.2d 491 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 929 (1961). 
120. Prior to the adoption of rule 613, objections to questions in categories (2), 
(3), and (4) were often made and sustained on the_ ground of lack of adequate 
foundation, referring to the fact that all elements of the traditional common-law 
foundation were not included. When such objections were overruled, the ruling us-
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( 5) Cross-examination posing a question containing the tradi-
tional full foundation. For example, "Didn't you say to Police Offi-
cer Smith on July 1, 1977, when he spoke with you at the scene 
of the accident, 'I got here about twenty seconds after I heard the 
collision. I didn't see it happen. Do you know what happened?' " 
Pursuant to rule 613(a), questions falling within any of the five 
categories would be permitted without prior disclosure to the witness 
of the contents of the written statement. However, questions falling 
within categories (4) or (5), and probably within category (3), would 
require disclosure of the prior statement to opposing counsel, if re-
quested, since the cross-examination of the witness concerns the 
prior statement. Such questions are distinguishable from questions 
to the witness about the underlying facts, which fall within category 
(1), or questions about the possible existence of a contrary state-
ment, which come under category (2). Questions falling within 
categories (1) and (2) do not concern a prior statement made by 
the witness, and thus they give rise to neither a rule 613(a) require-
ment of a good-faith basis nor the obligation to disclose the prior 
statement, if there is one, to opposing counsel.121 
ually was in response to the examining counsel's assertion that the question asked 
was preliminary to the laying of the traditional foundation. Even prior to rule 613, 
however, such questions should have been allowed as relevant to the recollection, 
frankness, and honesty of the witness. See People v. Jones, 160 Cal. 358, 364-65, 
117 P. 17 6, 179 ( 1911). Of course, category (3) and ( 4) questions should be ex-
cluded as "unwarranted insinuations" if the cross-examiner does not intend to proceed 
with impeachment. However, category (1) and (2) questions are proper even if they 
are not used preliminary to the laying of a foundation for impeachment. In practice, 
counsel most often refrain from asking a,question in categories (1) or (2), since the 
witness will almost always simply repeat his direct testimony or deny ever making an 
inconsistent statement. However, if counsel desires to ask such a question without 
intending to pursue the line of questioning unless he receives a "yes" answer, the ques-
tion on balance seems unobjectionable, since neither the question nor the answer seems 
to create an unwarranted risk of insinuation of a prior inconsistent statement. 
Dean Hale summarizes the correct position-which was accepted by rule 613-
on the allowability of such questions: 
[I]n cross-examining a witness concerning an alleged prior oral contradictory 
statement, it is not necessary to call his attention to the time, place and parties 
present. It is only with reference to, and as a basis for the later calling of an 
impeaching witness, that the requirement as to time, _Place, et cetera figures. 
Pursuant to one of the basic purposes of cross-examination, it seems entirely ap-
propriate in testing the assurance, and indeed the frankness and honesty, of the 
witness with reference to his testimony to challenge him with the other possible 
prior versions of the facts in conflict therewith without requiring the cross-ex-
aminer at that point to reveal all the bases of contradiction that he may have 
in reserve. There may well be something very revealing in the contrasts that 
appear in answering a first inquiry and a more pointed subsequent inquiry. ,This 
contrast becomes particularly vivid if the witness at first denies any prior con-
flicting statement and then is confronted with a letter over his own signature in 
which the conflicting statement appears. Weaknesses of memory, if not dishon-
esty, stand out in bold relief. 
Hale, supra note 86, at 149. See 4 J. WIGMORE, supra note 10, § ,1260. 
121. Rule 613(a) provides that "on request the same [prior inconsistent state-
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Turning to 613(b), extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent oral 
or written statement is not permitted unless the witness is afforded 
an opportunity to explain or deny and the opposite party is afforded 
an opportunity to interrogate him thereon. As pointed out in the 
Advisory Committee Note, rule 613(b) permits extrinsic proof to 
be introduced before the witness is allowed to admit, deny, or ex-
plain the prior statement.122 Moreover, what is important under rule 
613(b) is the opportunity to deny or explain, not whether any denial 
or explanation actually occurs. Thus the foundation requirement is 
satisfied if the witness remains available for recall by the calling 
party later in the course of the trial, even if that party chooses not 
to recall the witness. 
Rule 613 (b) does not, however, address the question of when 
cross-examination concerning the prior inconsistent statement has 
proceeded to focus the witness' attention upon the circumstances sur-
rounding the alleged making of the prior inconsistent statement to 
such an extent that the witness may be said to have been afforded 
an opportunity to deny or explain the statement on redirect examina-
tion. Returning to the illustration, if a full foundation is provided-
i.e., if the questioning covers the time, place, persons present, and 
content of the prior statement and thus comes under the rubric of 
category (5) above-an opportunity is obviously provided to oppos-
ing counsel to explore the prior inconsistent statement on redirect 
and to bring out any explanation the witness may have. Further-
more, it is clear that, if the witness on cross-examination is ex-
ment] shall be shown or disclosed to opposing counsel." This provision apparently 
contemplates that the exact words of the prior inconsistent statement rather than 
merely the substance be disclosed even if the prior statement was oral. This dis-
closure may be done by giving opposing counsel a copy of the statement or by refer-
ring to the appropriate segment if he already has a copy. For oral statements, a 
copy, if reduced to writing, may be given or may be transmitted orally at the side 
bar. See also note 119 supra. _ 
122. Advisory Committee Note to Proposed Rule 613, 56 F.R.D. 183, 279 
(1972). ("[t]he traditional insistence that the attention of the witness be directed 
to the statement on cross-examination is relaxed in favor of simply providing the wit-
ness an opportunity to explain and the opposite party an opportunity to examine on 
the statement, with no specification of any particular time or sequence"). In spite 
of the clear language of the Advisory Committee Note and the position adopted in 
3 WEINSTEIN, supra note 10, ,r 613[04] (1975), in United States v. International 
Bus. Machs. Corp., 432 F. Supp. 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), the court, in requiring 
prior disclosure, stated that two circuits have taken the position that prior disclosure 
is required by rule 613(b). The two cases cited at 432 F. Supp. at 140 n.10-United 
States v. Truslow, 530 F.2d 257 (4th Cir. 1975), and United States v. Wright, 489 
F.2d 1181 (D.C. Cir. 1973)-although involving trials occurring prior to the effec-
tive date of the federal rules, do in fact support the proposition for which they are 
cited. For further discussion of cases involving a foundation requirement under rule 
613(b), see note 132 infra. 
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amined only about the underlying facts (category (1) questions), 
no such opportunity to opposing counsel is provided. Similarly, 
questions falling within categories (2) or (3) above seem inade-
quate to satisfy the requirement that the witness' attention be suffi-
ciently focused upon the prior inconsistent statement. Whether 
cross-examination employing a partial but not full foundation-
category ( 4) questioning-provides the witness the requisite oppor-
tunity to explain or deny so that extrinsic proof is permitted without 
reference to his continued availability would likely depend upon the 
content of and circumstances surrounding the question asked. For 
example, cross-examination that first involves the time, place, and 
circumstances of a prior conversation but that then inquires merely 
whether a particular subject matter was discussed would probably 
be insufficient. However, an inquiry such as "Didn't you previously 
tell a police officer that you didn't see the accident happen?" would 
seem to apprise the witness adequately. Of course, cross-examining 
counsel, by introducing at the appropriate juncture extrinsic evidence 
of the prior statement while insuring the continued availability of the 
witness, could protect against the possibility that the court would con-
clude that the questions asked upon cross-examination did not raise 
the proper opportunity to explain or deny. In any event, it is im-
portant to realize that, if opposing counsel does recall the witness 
for denial or explanation followed by cross-examination relating 
thereto, the prior statement in one form or another will have been 
placed before the jury on as many as five separate occasions-cross-
examination, extrinsic evidence, cross-examination upon the extrinsic 
evidence, recall of the witness for explanation, and cross-examina-
tion again. 
Rule 613(b) not only enables examining counsel to place the 
prior inconsistent statement before the trier of fact on multiple occa-
sions, but it also permits the party impeaching the witness to delay 
the witness' denial or explanation. For example, if the content of 
the prior inconsistent statement is first introduced through extrinsic 
evidence as part of defendant's case-in-chief, plaintiff wi11 in all 
likelihood be foreclosed from presenting the witness' explanation 
or deni~ until rebuttal.123 This delay, which may well be sub-
stantial, could seriously impair the plaintiff's ability to rehabilitate the 
witness.· Moreover, in addition to the fact that the mere mention 
of the statement in rebuttal permits it to be scrutinized yet another 
123. While rule 611 provides the court with discretion to control the order of wit-
ness examination, it is unlikely that an explanation will be permitted prior to rebuttal. 
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time upon further cross-examination of the witness, it seems clear 
that even if plaintiff's counsel does choose to offer an explanation, 
[g]iven such time to crystallize, it is questionable whether the jury's 
estimation of the witness can be restored to its former status by his 
belated explanation. Conceivably, the jury may be even more prone 
to discount the belated explanation knowing that the witness has had 
the opportunity to confer with counsel after the evidence of the incon-
sistent statement was presented.124 
Cross-examining counsel wishing to highlight a prior inconsistency 
in this manner may now do so, for rule 613(b) provides that the 
witness need no longer be given the chance to deny or explain his 
prior statement before admission of extrinsic evidence. Moreover, 
under rule 613(b) a party wishing to emphasize an inconsistent 
statement he believes the witness will admit making may avoid the 
danger that a court will exclude extrinsic evidence of the prior state-
ment125 by simply introducing the extrinsic evidence before the wit-
ness is provided an opportunity to admit, deny, or explain.126 
124. Note, Modification of the Foundational Requirement for Impeaching Wit-
nesses: California Evidence Code Section 770, 18 HAsnNGS L.J. 210, 219 (1966). 
See also Advisory Committee Note to Proposed Rule 106, 56 F.R.D. 183, 200 (1972). 
125. See, e.g., Dilley v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 327 F.2d 249, 251 (6th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 824 (1964). McCormick says that exclusion of extrinsic evi-
dence following the witness' admission was the prevailing and better view, EVIDENCE, 
supra note 12, § 37, at 73; but see 3A J. WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 1037, at 1044-
46. See also text at notes 1107-12 supra. 
126. 3 WEINSTEIN, supra note 10, ~ 613[04] at 613-17 to -19, asserts that 
rule 613 may facilitate counsel in putting certain improperly authenticated evidence 
before the jury. In Dickinson Supply, Inc. v. Montana-Dakota Util. Co., 423 F.2d 
106 (8th Cir. 1970), a pre-Federal Rules decision, counsel sought to impeach a wit-
ness with a written statement the witness had signed. The witness admitted that the 
signature was his, but then denied making the statement. While the jury was absent, 
it was revealed that the witness' supervisor had prepared the statement based on 
other persons' accounts of the incident. The court refused to allow the statement 
to be used for impeachment because the impeaching party could not prove that the 
witness actually made the remarks contained in the written declaration. 
3 WEINSTEIN, supra note 10, ~ 613(04], at 613-18, asserts that under rule 613 
the statement in Dickinson Supply could have been read to the jury in the process 
of authenticating the witness' signature long before the fact that the witness had not 
made the statement was discovered; thus, only a jury instruction to disregard the 
statement, a device of questionable effectiveness at best, would have been available 
to undo the harm. At the point when the extrinsic evidence was to be introduced, 
however, it would seem that opposing counsel could present the same evidence in-
dicating that the witness did not actually make the statements recorded in the report. 
In fact, traditional foundation procedure, when the full contents of the statement may 
be brought to the jury's attention as part of cross-examination prior to the introduc-
tion of extrinsic evidence, presents a greater danger that unauthenticated statements 
will come before the jury. Under rule 613(b), if extrinsic evidence is offered before 
any foundation is laid, questions regarding the authenticity of the statement should 
be resolved before the jury becomes aware of its contents. 
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D. A Proposed Amendment to Rule 613 
Having analyzed the provisions of rule 613, it is appropriate to 
consider the extent to which they improve upon prior federal prac-
tice. Clearly a major purpose of rule 613 was to eliminate the re-
strictions that the rule of the Queen's Case placed upon cross-
examination of a witness about a prior inconsistent written statement. 
Rule 613(a) now provides unequivocally that the contents of a wit-
ness' prior inconsistent statement, whether written or not, need not 
be disclosed to him at the time of cross-examination about the state-
ment. The requirement for disclosure of the statement to opposing 
counsel guards against abuse of the rule. In line with the essentially 
unanimous judgment of the commentators, rule 613(a) thus con-
cludes that any beneficial effect that accrues from shielding the jury 
from a witness' inaccurate testimony concerning his earlier writings 
is outweighed by the limitations the procedure places on the effec-
tive use of prior inconsistent statements to test the witness' credibil-
ity that results from the curtailment of the·element of surprise. 
The adoption of rule 613(a) is clearly both salutary and unsur-
prising, since the rule is essentially a codification of prior federal 
practice.127 The same, however, cannot be said of rule 613(b). 
Nor is it clear whether any justification exists for the rule's substan-
tial departure from the foundation rule as previously applied in the 
federal courts. The Advisory Committee Note suggests that rule 
613(b) will facilitate the questioning of collusive witnesses by per-
mitting several such witnesses to be examined before disclosure of 
a joint prior inconsistent statement.128 That rather infrequent bene-
fit hardly seems a plausible explanation for rule 613(b)'s significant 
modifications of traditional federal practice. Rather, it would seem 
that the rationale for rule 613(b) derives from a combination of two 
factors: (1) that rule 801(d)(l)(A), as proposed by the Advisory 
Committee, gave substantive effect to all prior inconsistent state-
ments, and (2) perceived lawyer incompetence. 
To understand the apparent reasoning of the Advisory Commit-
tee, one must keep in mind that, if prior inconsistent statements were 
admissible only for purposes of impeachment, the foundation re-
quirement would foster the use of such statements to affect credibil-
ity while discouraging the trier of fact from giving them substantive 
consideration. In practice, the foundation requirement served to 
127. See text at notes 94-100 supra. 
128. Advisory Committee Note to Proposed Rule 613, 56 F.R.D. 183, 279 
(1972). 
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place a prior statement in juxtaposition to the testimony at trial of 
the witness sought to be impeached. In addition, by enabling the 
witness to admit a prior statement as his own, the foundation require-
ment reduced the likelihood that extrinsic evidence of the prior in-
consistent statement would be introduced, evidence that is much 
harder for the jury not to accept substantively. Under the scheme 
of the proposed federal rules, however, all prior inconsistent state-
ments were to be admissible as substantive evidence pursuant to rule 
801(d)(l)(A). With the substantive admissibility of all such prior 
statements, this objective fostered by the foundation requirement was 
no longer relevant, and a practical consideration became paramount. 
Trial lawyers, for some unknown reason, often forget or, in some 
cases, never learned how to lay a proper foundation for extrinsic evi-
dence. The Advisory Committee politely referred to such forgetful-
ness or incompetence as the "dangers of oversight." With substan-
tive admissibility, these "oversight[s]" could be legitimated by per-
mitting introduction of prior inconsistent statements at any time so 
long as the witness was eventually given an opportunity to deny or 
explain. In short, it was easier to switch than fight. 
As enacted by Congress, however, rule 80l(d)(l)(A) does not 
permit the substantive admission of all prior inconsistent statements. 
Thus, the traditional foundation requirements' utility in encouraging 
the jury to consider the prior inconsistent statements solely as an in-
dication of credibility and not as substantive evidence remains rele-
vant, and accordingly the requirements should be resurrected. Since 
all prior inconsistent statements are not substantively admissible, 
counsel should not have the unfettered right to introduce extrinsic 
evidence of such a statement before the witness has an opportunity 
to admit, deny, or explain the declaration. This procedure permits 
a prior statement to be placed before the trier of fact on multiple 
occasions and under circumstances encouraging the statement's ac-
ceptance as substantive evidence, and therefore it should be avail-
able only as the interests of justice require.129 
In summary, the provisions of rule 613(a) largely codify existing 
federal practice regarding cross-examination about a witness' oral and 
written prior inconsistent statements. Rule 613 (b) takes a step for-
ward in rejecting strict adherence to the traditional founda.tion re-
129. As set forth in the Advisory Committee Note, the "interests of justice" 
would require ignoring the foundation requirements if the witness after testifyi!lg be-
came unavailable by the time the prior statement was discovered or if counsel wishes 
to examine several collusive witnesses before disclosing a joint prior inconsistent 
statement. 56 F.R.D. at 278-79, 
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quirements and in expressly recognizing the courts' authority to 
dispense with those requirements where the "interests of justice" 
so require. It is apparent, however, that rule 613 (b )'s other liberali-
zations of the traditional foundation rule are ill-conceived. The 
Advisory Committee Note states that rule 613(b) preserves the 
traditional foundation requirement with "some modifications."130 
It does nothing of the kind. Rule 613 (b) removes the very heart 
of the traditional foundation requirement-that the witness be given 
an opportunity to deny or explain the prior statement be/ ore evidence 
of the prior statement will be admitted-a requirement facilitating 
the introduction of prior inconsistent statements solely for the pur-
. pose of impeachment.131 Given Congress' amendment to rule 
801(d)(l)(A), the opportunity to explain or deny should occur prior 
to the introduction of any extrinsic evidence. Accordingly, rule 
613 (b) should be amended to state: 
Extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statement of witness. 
Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is not 
admissible until the witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or 
deny the same and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to 
interrogate him thereon, unless the interests of justice otherwise re-
quire. This provision does not apply to admissions of a party-
opponent as defined in rule 801(d)(2).132 
N. RULE 607-lMPEACHING ONE'S OWN WITNESS 
A. The Dilemma 
A detailed discussion of the historical development of the 
voucher rule and its rejection in the provisions of the Federal Rules 
130. Id. 
131. ·Professor Cleary, who served as the reporter to the committee, suggested 
that acceptance of rule 613(b) was less than whole-hearted even prior to the amend-
ment to rule 801(d)(l)(A): 
In my view, the existing practice would continue in general to be followed 
under the rule. It is convenient and effective to raise the matter on cross-exam-
ination, and doing so would avoid problems that might ultimately arise if wit-
nesses become unavailable before the end of the trial. The rule ought, however, 
to remain as drawn, leaving the practical approach to the good sense of the prac• 
titioner. 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice on Proposed Rules of Evidence, 
93d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 2, at 74-75 Supp. (1973). 
The requirement that a proper foundation be laid prior to the introduction of ex-
trinsic evidence unless the interests of justice require otherwise is currently applied 
with respect to establishing bias. United States v. Di Napoli, 557 F.2d 962 (2d Cir. 
1977). 
132. Cf. MINN. R. Evm. 613(b) (requiring that witness be given opportunity to 
explain before prior inconsistent statement offered into evidence). 
Several cases decided since the adoption of the Federal Rules but involving trials 
that took place before the l\ules became effective have cited rule 613(b) as consis-
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tent with their holdings. In Strudl v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 536 F.2d 242 
(8th Cir. 1976), a diversity case involving a wrongful death action, the court, though 
apparently applying Nebraska evidence law, quoted rule 613 (b) and part of the Ad-
visory Committee Note to demonstrate that no foundation was required before the 
introduction of evidence of a witness' prior inconsistent statement. Since the im-
peaching party recalled his opponent's witness and questioned her concerning her 
prior statement, the court concluded that the witness had "full opportunity to explain 
or deny her alleged inconsistent statements." 536 F.2d at 244-45. 
In United States v. Inslow, 530 F.2d 257, 264 (4th Cir. 1975), another pre-Rules 
case, the impeachment procedure employed was found to satisfy the traditional rule 
rejected in Strudl, though the court in a footnote stated that "[o]ur holding is consist-
ent with Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 613(b)." 530 F.2d at 264 n.4. The hold-
ing was in fact consistent with the rule only to the extent that a foundation satisfying 
the traditional rule would automatically satisfy rule 613(b). 
Several recent cases have applied rule 613(b) after its effective date. Two cases 
from the Eighth Circuit found the rule satisfied when the witness was given an oppor-
tunity to explain or deny his prior statements before extrinsic evidence was intro-
duced in accord with prior federal practice. United States v. Rogers, 549 F.2d 490 
(8th Cir. 1976); Osborne v. United States, 542 F.2d 1015 (8th Cir. 1976). The 
only post-adoption case to deal with rule 613 (b) at any length is United States v. 
Barrett, 539 F.2d 244 (1st Cir. 1976), in which the defendant was charged with inter-
state transportation and sale of stolen postage stamps. The government's witness, 
one Adams, had testified that the defendant had admitted his involvement in the 
crime shortly after his arrest. Defense counsel then called two witnesses who testi-
fied that Adams had told them that it was a shame that the defendant had been ar-
rested because he knew the defendant was innocent. The trial judge excluded this 
testimony, but the appellate court reversed, rejecting the government's argument that 
a proper foundation had not been laid. The court noted that rule 613(b) "relaxed 
the traditional foundation rule," and thus the rule required only that the witness be 
afforded at some time an opportunity to explain or deny and that the opposing party 
be given a chance to interrogate the witness further. 539 F.2d at 254-55. After 
quoting extensively from the commentary of the reporter of the Federal Rules, the 
court stated: 
The foregoing indicates that while good practice still calls for the laying of a 
foundation, one is not absolutely required. It would have been desirable for de-
fense counsel to have asked Adams on cross-examination if he had made the pur-
ported statement to Delaney. And where this was not done, if Adams had later 
become unavailable to explain or deny, the court might properly in its discretion 
have refused to receive the testimony in question. Here, however, the court dis-
missed the evidence out of hand and made no inquiry into Adams' availability. 
On the present record, we have no basis for assuming that he was not available, 
or even that judicial economy and convenience would have justified the court in 
ruling as it did. We hold, therefore, that it was error to exclude the testimony. 
539 F.2d at 255-56. Given the court's suggestion that as a matter of "good practice" 
the foundation should generally precede the impeaching evidence, it would seem that, 
under Barrett, if a party seeks to introduce impeaching statements the trial judge 
should assure himself that the witness to be impeached is available for recall. If he 
is not available or, as Barrett suggests, if recall would result in significant delay, the 
court should, in its discretion, exclude the evidence. 
It is, of course, still too early to draw authoritative conclusions concerning the 
effect of rule 613 on the procedure for impeachment with prior inconsistent 
statements. It does appear, however, that the courts may encourage counsel to follow 
the traditional federal foundation rule of giving the witness a chance to deny or 
explain his prior statement before introducing extrinsic evidence by excluding such 
evidence when the witness under attack is no longer available or the recall procedure 
would foster undue delay. See FED. R. Evm. 6ll(a) & 403; note '122 supra. 
The final sentence of rule 613 (b) provides specifically that its provisions do not 
apply to admissions, as defined in rule 801(d)(2). Although the Advisory Commit-
tee Note makes no mention of the final sentence, the apparent intention of the com-
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of Evidence regarding examination and impeachment of a party's 
own witness has been presented elsewhere.133 Accordingly, only a 
brief summary is provided herein. Federal courts, aware that the 
traditional rationale underlying the voucher rule did not withstand 
analysis, nevertheless came to appreciate that the rule prohibiting 
a party from impeaching his own witness had certain beneficial ef-
fects. Although recognizing that prior inconsistent statements used 
by a party to impeach his own witness were admissible solely for 
the purpose of impeachment and not as substantive evidence, many 
courts and commentators realized that limiting instructions were in-
effective and that juries would consider such evidence substan-
tively.134 Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
federal courts permitted impeachment of a party's own witness only 
where the witness' testimony both surprised and affirmatively dam-
aged the calling party. Application of the voucher rule in all but 
these circumstances was thought to prevent a party from placing 
prior inconsistent statements before the jury under the guise of im-
peachment, while still permitting impeachment where it was truly 
needed.135 
Although the voucher rule came to be accepted as necessary to 
prevent jury misuse of a witness' prior inconsistent statement, rule 
801(d)(l)(A) as initially proposed nullified that rationale: with 
substantive admissibility of all prior inconsistent statements, juries 
would be allowed to give such statements substantive effect. Ac-
cordingly, rule 607, which was drafted upon the supposition that 
mittee was to eliminate even the slightest possibility that the provisions would be con• 
strued as applicable to admissions. In this respect, rule 613(b) conforms to the vast 
majority of decisions under the common law. 4 J. WIGMORB, supra note 10, § 1051. 
All things considered, it is unclear what motivated the inclusion of the provision 
regarding admissions in the rule itself rather than in the Advisory Committee Note. 
Based upon the resulting language of the rule, one could argue that statements other-
wise admissible substantively either as a hearsay exception pursuant to rule 803 or 
as not hearsay pursuant to the provisions of rule 801 ( other than either 801 ( d )( 1) 
(A) or 80l(d)·(2)) are subject to the requirements of rule 613(b) if in fact they 
are inconsistent with in-court testimony of the witness. This contention is without 
merit. Rule 613(b) is intended to apply only to those prior inconsistent statements 
substantively admissible solely by reason of rule 80l(d)(l)(A) or admissible for im-
peachment purposes only pursuant to rule 607. Thus, rule 613(b) is inapplicable to 
statements substantively admissible without reference to the fact that the statement 
also happens to be inconsistent with the in-court testimony of the witness. 
133. See Graham, supra note 44. 
134. See, e.g., Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, 
J., concurring); United States v. De Sisto, 329 F.2d 929, 933 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
377 U.S. 979 (1964); McCORMICK:, supra note 10, § 59; Morgan, supra note 10, at 
193 (calling the practice a "pious fraud"). 
135. Graham, supra note 44, at 979-80. 
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all prior inconsistent statements would be substantively admissible, 
rejects the voucher rule in the following language: 
Who May Impeach 
The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, includ-
ing the party calling him.136 
As previously stated, Congress eventually amended rule 801(d) 
(l)(A) to limit substantive admissibility of prior inconsistent state-
ments to those statements originally made in testimonial form. 
There was, however, no corresponding amendment to rule 607 to 
bring it back into conformity with this prior federal practice, and thus 
no express limitation presently exists on the calling party's ability to 
place in evidence a witness' prior inconsistent statement.187 Al-
136. FED. R. Evm. 607. 
137. Although rule 607 on its face places no restrictions on a party's ability to 
impeach his own witness, some possibility exists that courts will interpret the rule as 
retaining the traditional requirements of surprise and affirmative damage. In United 
States v. Morlang, 531 F.2d 183 (4th Cir. 1975), the Fourth Circuit reversed a con-
viction at a pre-Rules trial because the government had been allowed to introduce for 
purposes of impeachment extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by its 
own witness that inculpated the defendant. The court noted that the government was 
"fully aware" that the witness' courtroom testimony would tend to exonerate the de-
fendant and, although acknowledging that the voucher rule had been rejected in the 
Fourth Circuit, concluded that 
it has never been the rule that a party may call a witness where his testimony 
is known to be adverse for the purpose of impeaching him. To so hold would 
permit the government, in the name of impeachment, to present testimony to the 
jury by indirection which would not otherwise be admissible. The courts have 
consistently refused to sanction such a practice. 
531 F.2d at 189. As the trial had taken place before the adoption of the Federal 
Rules, the court was not required to decide whether rule 607, read in light of the 
revision in rule 801, required that holding. 531 F.2d at 189 n.14. The court's opin-
ion on the matter, however, is perhaps suggested by its statement that "[t]he over-
whelming weight of authority is, however, that impeachment by prior inconsistent 
statement may not be permitted where employed as a mere subterfuge to get before 
the jury evidence not otherwise admissible." 531 F.2d at 190 (footnote omitted). 
Though Morlang, as the Morlang court itself suggested, would seem to have little 
precedential value with respect to the interpretation of rule 607, 531 F.2d at 189 n.14, 
the Eighth Circuit, in United States v. Rogers, 549 F.2d 490 (8th Cir. 1976), a case 
controlled by the Federal Rules, took pains to distinguish the Morlang decision in 
holding proper the government's impeachment of its witness who at trial denied any 
memory of a prior inconsistent statement he had allegedly given inculpating both 
himself and the defendant. Finding the elements of surprise and affirmative damage 
that had been absent in Morlang, the court stated: 
In contrast to the witness in United States v. Morlang, ••• Baker had never, 
before trial, taken the position that he could not identify appellant or that he 
could not recall if appellant was one of the robbers. This doubt about appel-
lant's participation expressed by one of the actual participants was indeed poten-
tially injurious to the government, and it was of sufficient relevance to justify 
impeachment by use of the inconsistent statement. 
549 F.2d at 497. 
However, despite its explicit finding that the government had been surprised and 
damaged by the witness' testimony, the court refrained from any conclusion about the 
proper interpretation of rule 607, noting only that it was "not at all sure" that sur-
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though juries will be instructed to give no substantive weight to a 
witness' prior statement unless it was ~tially made in testimonial 
form, the effectiveness of such an instruction is, as discussed 
above, 138 highly doubtful. 
A recent federal case illustrates how present rule 607 may nullify 
the safeguards that Congress intended to place on the use of prior 
inconsistent statements under rule 801(d)(l)(A). In United 
States v. Alvarez, 130 the defendant was prosecuted for attempting to 
smuggle 1600 pounds of marijuana across the Rio Grande. At trial, 
the government called as a witness one Villareal, who had previously 
confessed his participation in the scheme and had allegedly given 
a statement to government agents placing defendant Alvarez at the 
scene of the crime. Prior to the trial, Villareal had denied making 
prise under the new rule remained a prerequisite to a party's impeachment of its own 
witness. 
Another case controlled by the new rules in which the court focused upon the 
element of surprise, though not expressly holding it to be required under rule 607, is 
United States v. Garcia, 530 F.2d 650 (6th Cir. 1976). In Garcia, a government 
witness who had allegedly made prior statements inculpating the defendant denied in 
his courtroom testimony any knowledge of the defendant's guilt. Over defense objec-
tions that the government was impeaching its own witness, the government was per-
mitted to introduce extrinsic evidence of the alleged prior inconsistent statements. In 
upholding that impeachment as proper, the Sixth Circuit, although not purporting to 
interpret rule 607, emphasized the government's surprise, noting that up until its wit-
ness' appearance at trial the government believed his testimony would be consistent 
with his alleged prior statements. 
Three other recent cases applying rule 607 tend to rebut any inference from Mor-
lang, Rogers, and Garcia that courts will interpret the rule as retaining the surprise 
and affirmative damage requirements of prior federal practice. In United States v. 
Carter, No. 75-2216 (4th Cir. March 13, 1976), an unreported decision noted at 532 
F.2d 752, the government called to the stand the defendant's brother, who denied his 
own involvement in the robbery attempt with which the defendant was charged. Sub-
sequently the government impeached the witness with evidence of a prior inconsistent 
statement and by drawing from him an admission that he had pleaded guilty to state 
charges that he was an accessory after the fact to the robbery attempt. Although 
it is unclear whether the government was surprised by the testimony of the defend-
ant's brother, the Fourth Circuit, in holding the impeachment proper, suggested that 
the question was irrelevant. The court stated first that ''Federal Rule of Evidence 
607 provides that the party who calls a witness may impeach his testimony," and then 
noted that "United States v. Morlang, - F.2d -, No. 74-2071 (4th Cir. Dec. 30, 
1975), held that in the absence of surprise a party may not impeach his own witness, 
but that case is inapposite here, for it was not decided under the Federal Rules of 
Evidence." 
United States v. Alvarez, 548 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1977), provides an even clearer 
statement that rule 607 will not be read to place limitations on a party's ability to 
impeach its own witness. See text at notes 139-40 infra. Accord, United States v. 
Palacios, 556 F.2d 1359, 1363 (5th Cir. 1977) ("[u]nder Rule 607 the government's 
impeachment of [the witness] by her prior inconsistent statement was proper without 
a showing of surprise"). 
138. See notes 21-23 & 134 supra and accompanying text. 
139. 548 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1977). 
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that statement, and he reiterated that position in his subsequent testi-
mony at trial. Although there was no question that the government 
was not surprised by- the testimony it elicited from Villareal, it was 
permitted to call the narcotics agents in whose presence Villareal had 
allegedly incriminated Alvarez, and they testified about Villareal's 
purported statement. The jury, which had been instructed to con-
sider the agent's testimony only as evidence of Villareal's credibility, 
subsequently found Alvarez guilty. Upon Alvarez' appeal, the Fifth 
Circuit summarily rejected the contention that the government's im-
peachment of Villareal was improper, ruling that the issue was "fore-
closed by Rule 607. "140 
Given the notorious inability of juries to ignore substantively 
evidence introduced solely for purposes of impeachment, the Fifth 
Circuit's application of rule 607 creates the precise danger Congress 
feared when it limited the substantive admissibility of prior inconsis-
tent statements under rule 801(d)(l)(A)-namely, that a defen-
dant might be convicted on th~ basis of an unverified out-of-court 
statement. The Fifth Circuit's ruling vindicates Congress' concern in 
this area and requires reimposition of the sur-prise and affirmative 
damage prerequisites to a party's impeachment of his own witness. 
As developed by the federal courts prior to the adoption of the new 
rules of evidence, those twin prerequisites shield the jury from prior 
inconsistent statements not substantively admissible in situations 
where the interests of justice so require. As I have stated elsewhere, 
[i]n the absence of both surprise and damage, impeachment of one's 
own witness is inappropriate. If the witness does not give affirm-
atively damaging testimony, the {party] simply does not need to 
attack his credibility. If the witness' testimony does not surprise 
the [party], it should not be permitted to impeach his testimony by 
placing before the jury the witness' prior statement because it could 
have refrained from eliciting the statement it seeks to impeach. The 
requirement of surprise would prevent the [party] from consciously 
introducing affirmatively damaging testimony under the only cir-
cumstances in which it would do so-when the potential effect on 
the jury of the prior inconsistent statement outweighs the affirm-
atively damaging effect of the elicited testimony.141 
The most recent supplement to Weinstein's Evidence suggests 
a different approach to the problem of preventing abusive practice 
under rule 607: 
Instead of placing so much emphasis on the motive of the prof-
feror, an approach more consistent with the underlying policy of the 
140. 548 F.2d at 543 n.3. 
141. Graham, supra note 44, at 979-80. 
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federal rules of evidence would be to analyze the problems in terms 
of Rule 403-is the probative value of the impeaching evidence out-
weighed by its prejudicial impact?142 
In practice, the balancing test of rule 403 would prove inferior 
to the simple surprise and damage requirement for several reasons. 
Initially, it is questionable in light of the clear language of rule 607 
whether a judge would even consider balancing pursuant to rule 403. 
Moreover, ad hoc balancing requires a judge under the pressures of 
a trial situation to sort out and weigh the probative value of evidence 
upon witness credibility against the possibility that it will confuse the 
issues or mislead the jury. Accordingly, balancing is unlikely to pro-
duce uniform or predictable results. In addition, two of the key fac-
tors suggested by Weinstein's Evidence, probative value and prejudi-
cial impact, appear to vary directly: the more probative a prior state-
ment is of credibility, the greater the likelihood that the jury will 
improperly view it as substantive evidence; the less probative of 
credibility, the less the risk that the statement will be improperly 
considered.148 Finally, balancing pursuant to rule 403 is likely to 
be time-consuming and of limited effectiveness in screening the jury 
from potentially prejudicial prior statements. As Weinstein's Evi-
dence envisions the process, the judge would make his rule 403 rul-
ing only after the witness had been confronted with his alleged prior 
statement in the presence of the jury. 144 In order to determine the 
probative value of the alleged prior statement, the judge would then 
inquire into the degree of certainty that the statement was made. 
This inquiry, which would, of course, take place initially outside the 
jury's presence, would often cause substantial delay, for unless ex-
trinsic evidence could be presented on the existence of the prior 
statement, the application of rule 403 balancing would be ineffec-
tive. Moreover, it is not clear that such procedures would ade-
quately prevent prejudice, since the jury would become aware of the 
prior inconsistent statement before the court initiated its inquiry and 
since the court would most likely find, given the availability of a 
142. 3 WEINSTEIN, supra note 10, ,r 607[01] at 20 (1976 Cum. Supp.). 
143. See Graham, The Relationship Among Federal Rules of Evidence 607, 801 
(dXIXA), and 403: A Reply to Weinstein's Evidence, 55 TExAs L REV. 573, 579 
(1977). 
144. 3 WEINSTEIN, supra note 10, ,r 607[01] (1976 Cum. Supp.). According 
to Weinstein, "[v]ery seldom are evidence questions ruled upon by a pre-trial judge. 
Where discretion is involved, it is usual to postpone decision until the trial. • • . 
Often it is not until the trial that the need for a special type of hearsay becomes 
apparent." Weinstein, Alternatives to the Present Hearsay Rule, 44 F.R.D. 375, 380 
(1968). 
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limiting instruction, that the probative value of the impeaching evi-
dence upon credibility outweighed any potential prejudice. 
On the other hand, the surprise and affirmative damage approach 
utilizes criteria developed over the years on a case-by-case basis. 
The approach is easier to apply and more predictable than rule 403. 
The criteria of surprise and damage exclude only those-and all of 
those-statements that the jury should not legitimately consider and, 
if properly applied,145 keep all reference to the existence of the prior 
statement from the jury.146 In summary, in all civil cases and in 
those criminal cases in which the government seeks to impeach its 
own witness,147 both current rule 80l(d)(l)(A) and proposed 
amended rule 80l(d)(l)(A) mandate reimposition of the tradi-
tional requirements of surprise and affirmative damage for a calling 
party to impeach his own witness. 
C. The Proposal 
Rule 607 should be amended to state: 
The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, except 
that the credibility of a witness may be attacked by the party calling 
the witness by means of a prior inconsistent statement only upon a 
showing of surprise and affirmative damage. The foregoing excep-
tion does not apply to impeachment by means of a prior inc0nsis-
tent statement admitted pursuant to Rule 80l(d)(l)(A), 80l(d) 
(2), or 803. 
Clarification is in order about how proposed rule 607 applies to 
several common situations. The requirement of surprise may be in-
appropriate in criminal cases where impeachment is by the criminal 
defendant: it could impede the defendant's right to confront the wit-
ness, to present a defense, and to produce witnesses on his own 
behalf.148 Moreover, whether the prerequisite of surprise may con-
stitutionally be held applicable to the criminal defendant is still 
unclear; resolution of this issue awaits development upon a case-by-
case basis.149 It should also be noted that the· requirements of sur-
145. See generally Graham, supra note 44, at 996-1005. 
146. There are constitutional ramifications to any limitations on the ability of a 
criminal defendant to impeach his own witness by use of prior inconsistent state-
ments. A prerequisite of surprise seems unwarranted in light of the criminal defend-
ants' constitutional right to confrontation, to present a defense, and to produce wit-
nesses on his own behalf. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973); Gra-
ham, supra note 44, at 984-86. Since this requirement is constitutional, it could be 
recognized by courts without specifically incorporating it into rule 607 itself. 
147. See note 146 supra. 
148. See note 146 supra and accompanying text. 
149. See Graham, supra note 44, at 985-86. The Supreme Court granted cer-
1618 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 75:1565 
prise and affirmative damage apply not only to the calling party but 
also to all parties similarly situated. Thus, a coplaintiff or codefend-
ant similarly situated \\'.ith respect to that aspect of the witness' testi-
mony sought to be impeached would be subject to the same restric-
tions. Rather than include this gloss in the rule itself, it is suggested 
that rules 611(a)(l) and 403 presently provide ample authority for 
the court to prohibit such attempted impeachment. 
Of course, impeachment of a party's own witness through a show-
ing of bias, interest, prejudice, lack of opportunity to observe, or 
faulty recollection would still be permissible under proposed rule 
607. With respect to impeachment by acts of misconduct (rule 
608(b)) and prior convictions (rule 609), surprise and affirmative 
damage should generally be required.150 However, considering that 
rules 403151 and 611(a) as well as rules 608(b) and 609 provide 
ample authority for imposition of those prerequisites, it seems unne-
cessary to include this limitation in the language of rule 607. More-
over, the absence of such restrictive language will permit a calling 
party to impeach his own witness by use of prior conviction under 
circumstances where the prerequisites of surprise and damage seem 
inappropriate, such as where the prosecutor wishes to divulge upon 
direct examination that his witness, a prior codefendant, had pled 
guilty to a particular offense arising out of the circumstances for 
which the defendant is now being tried.152 Although one could 
tiorari in Maness v. Wainwright, 512 F.2d 88 (5th Cir. 1975), c~rt. gra11ted, 429 
U.S. 893 (1976), in which one issue was whether the trial court's refusal to allow the 
criminal defendant to impeach his own witness with prior inconsistent statements vio-
lated the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial, but the Court then dismissed 
certiorari as improvidently granted. 430 U.S. 550 (1977). See also Chambers v. 
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), discussed i11 Graham, supra note 44, at 941-46, 
984-86. 
150. See Graham, supra note 44, at 982-91. 
151. In the congressional hearings concerning rule 609, Judge Friendly commented 
upon the relation of rule 403 to specific provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence: 
You have the problem: Does [Rule 403] apply when there is a specific rule 
on the subject? This just says relevant evidence may be excluded if it has this 
effect. But then somebody is going to argue, this other rule dealt very specific-
ally with the question and rule 403 is out. I don't know what the answer would 
be. It is just another illustration that this code, far from settling problems, cre-
ates a great many of them. 
Heari11gs on Proposed Rules of Evidence Before the Special Subcomm. on Reform 
of Federal Criminal Laws of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 
ser. 2, at 252 (1973). 
152. Although it is proper for the state to elicit on direct testimony the fact that 
its witness has pleaded guilty to a charge arising from the same event for which the 
defendant is on trial, whether the prosecution should be permitted to itself bring out 
other convictions of the witness seems best handled on a case-by-case basis. Relevant 
considerations would be the same as those underlying imposition of the surprise and 
affirmative damage requirements. See United States v. Chamley, 376 F.2d 57 (7th 
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argue that such disclosure constitutes development of background in-
information153 customarily introduced to aid the trier of fact's under-
standing, it is not clear that such a contention would be accepted 
if an explicit restriction were included within rule 607. 
Finally, it is not intended that rule 607 be applied to foreclose 
a party from fully exploring the basis for the testimony of an op-
ponent's expert witness. Pursuant to rule 705,164 an expert may 
testify without prior disclosure of the basis of his opinion. In addi-
tion, rule 703155 provides that an expert may rely on nonadmitted 
and even inadmissible information to form his opinion if experts in 
the field reasonably rely on such information. If the party opposing 
the testimony of the expert desires to explore the basis of the 
expert's opinion, he may of course do so upon cross-examination of 
the expert himself .156 But what if the opposing party wishes to 
call at trial the witness upon whose information the expert had 
relied? Under such circumstances, the opposing party should be 
permitted to impeach the witness-by use of prior inconsistent state-
ments and any other impeachment tool-without reference to the 
prerequisites of surprise and affirmative damage.157 
V. CONCLUSION 
As submitted to Congress, the Federal Rules of Evidence dealt 
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 898 (1967); United States v. Dardi, 330 F.2d 316, 332-
33 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 845 (1964); United States v. Aronson, 319 F.2d 
48, 51 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 920 (1963). United States v. Freeman, 302 
F.2d 347,350 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 58 (1963), states: 
Of course it was proper for the government to bring out on direct examina-
tion the criminal record of its witness. . . • Not to have done so would surely 
have subjected the prosecution to criticism. The matter of informing the court 
and jury about information of such clear relevance as the criminal record of a 
witness called by the prosecution is not something which is to be reserved for 
the pleasure and strategy of the defense. Whatever the rule may be with respect 
to the permissible limits for cross-examination of a witness or a defendant, . . . 
it is usually proper and desirable that the party calling a witness with a criminal 
record should elicit such information on direct examination. 
There may be circumstances where, on proper request of the defense, the trial 
judge should limit, or even bar such testimony, or allow it only under cautionary 
instructions because the prejudice to the defendant of the witness' admission of 
crime implicating the defendant would outweigh the advantages of a full dis-
closure of the witness' criminal background. Here we find that there was no 
likelihood of prejudice. 
See also Graham, supra note 44, at 982-83. 
153. See Advisory committee Note to Proposed Rule 401, 56 F.R.D. 183, 215-
16 (1972). 
154. FED. R. EVID. 705. 
155. FED. R. EVID. 703. 
156. Cf. Graham, Discovery of Experts Under Rule 26(bX4) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure: Part Two, An Empirical Study and a Proposal, 1977 U. 
ILL. L.F. 169, 196 (1977) (general discussion of examination of expert witnesses). 
151. See CAL. EVID. CODE§ 804 (1966). 
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consistently with all aspects of the use of prior inconsistent state-
ments. The proposed rules allowed substantive admissibility of all 
prior inconsistent statements, significantly relaxed the foundation re-
quirement, and permitted impeachment of a party's own witness. 
Congressional action, however, disturbed this coordinated pattern of 
treatment. This disruption must now be corrected by appropriate 
amendments to rules 613 and 607. Moreover, although Con-
gress expressed a valid concern in addressing the question of sub-
stantive admissibility of prior inconsistent statements pursuant to 
rule 801(d)(l)(A), it failed to strike an optimum balance between 
substantive admissibility and the rights of the criminal defendant. 
Rule 80l(d)(l)(A) should be amended to provide for the substan-
tive admissibility of prior inconsistent statements of an in-court de-
clarant possessing personal knowledge of the underlying events if 
there is a high degree of certainty that the statements were in fact 
made. 
